The select committees of the 24th Oireachtas by Arkins, Audrey M.
THE SELECT COMMITTEES OF THE 24TH OIREACHTAS
by
AUDREY M. ARKINS
MANAGEMENT DIVISION 
DUBLIN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
DUBLIN
Submitted for the degree of Master, of Arts 
in the Management Division,
Dublin Business School 
National Institute for Higher Education, 
Dublin.
CONTENTS
PaEe.
LIST OF TABLES iii
ABBREVIATIONS iv
PREFACE vl
INTRODUCTION vii
ABSTRACT xi
CHAPTER ONE: 1
Parliamentary Reform
CHAPTER TWO: 45
The Dail Committee on Public Expenditure
CHAPTER THREE: 84
The Joint Commmittee on Commercial State-Sponsored 
Bodies
CHAPTER FOUR: 119
Other Oireachtas Select Committees
CONCLUSION: 141
NOTES 150
APPENDIX A: 160
APPENDIX B: 164
APPENDIX C: 166
APPENDIX D: 170
BIBLIOGRAPHY 171
iii
TABLE 1
TABLE 2
TABLE 3
TABLE 4
LIST OF TABLES
Page
(\ H  ^ -V .(*tX ,v vC e . C\X\cl C  Ip « .  W o l A  g y
TW( 0*v*w,\VUe Public
^  ^ V «
C f e ^ i ’V U ^  <*v P k W t 'i.  68
i * w ^  «-<*
■5«;WV  0 -  S w l ^ S .  9 9
t fH it .w iU '-'C e.: • i j ■ , - t o e3<>;^ v cew.^Hri<. ** Ywld«-^ i .
iv
ABBREVIATIONS
AHCS Association of Higher Civil Servants
BGE Bord Gais Eireann
BLC Joint Committee on Building Land
BTE Bord Telecom Eireann
C&AG Comptroller and Auditor General
CDCC Joint Committee on Co-operation with Developing
Countries 
CIE Coras Iompair Eireann
CLVC Dail Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism
DD Dail Debates
DPS Department of the Public Service
ESRI Economic and Social Research Council
ESB Electricity Supply Board
FF .Fianna Fail Party
FG Fine Gael Party
ILAC Irish Life Assurance Corporation
ILC Joint Committee on the Irish Language
ISL Irish Shipping Limited
LC Joint Committee on Legislation
2ndLC Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation of the EEC
Lab Labour Party
MBC Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown
NBST National Board of Science and Technology
NESC National Economic and Social Council
VOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OIE Ostlanna Iompair Eireann, Teoranta
PD Progressive Democrat Party
PEC Dail Committee on Public Expenditure
PPC Committee on Procedure and Privileges
PAYE Pay As You Earn
PRSI Pay Related Social Insurance
SBC Joint Committee on Small Businesses
SC Selection Committee
SD Seanad Debates
SSBC Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored
Bodies 
Teo Teoranta
VAT Value-Added Tax
WP Workers Party
vi
PREFACE
This dissertation is my own work and includes nothing which 
is the outcome of work done in collaboration. A report based 
on an earlier draft of chapter four has been published in the 
Irish Press, Inside Report, May 28th, 1987, and another
appears in Irish Political Studies. Volume 3, (1988),
pp.91-99.
I wish to thank the Dublin Business School, Management
Division at the NIHE, Dublin for awarding me an assisantship 
to undertake this research. For his vigilant guidance and 
advice throughout my research, I am indebted to my
supervisor, Dr Eunan O'Halpin. For kindly granting me
interviews and supplying otherwise inaccessible information 
and documentation, I am grateful to members of the Dail and 
Seanad, to civil servants and to the various journalists who 
generously took time to talk to me. Their views and comments 
are incorporated throughout this dissertation. My friends 
Caroline, Finbarr, Mary and Pat, read an earlier draft of
parts of this dissertation and made suggestions for its
improvement. To all these I am grateful, but especially to
Paul for his encouragement and support.
Introduction
This thesis seeks to present a detailed analysis of specific 
select committees at work during the 24th Oireachtas, namely 
the Joint Committee on State Sponsored Bodies and the Select 
Committee on Public Expenditure. A brief evaluative 
description of other select committees at work during this 
period is also included, and references will be made to 
parliamentary arrangements abroad.
Chapter one describes the factors which conditioned the 
extension of the Irish select committee system over the last 
decade and outlines the rules which have regulated their 
work. Chapters two and three focus on the activities of the 
Joint Committee on Public Expenditure and the Joint Committee 
on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies between 1983 and 1987. 
Chapter four briefly discusses the performance of the 
remaining fifteen committees at work during the same period, 
and describes media coverage of their activities.
This dissertation is based on select committee reports and 
minutes of evidence published during the 24th Oireachtas, and 
on parliamentary debates relating to those reports. 
Documentary analysis has been supplemented by an extensive, 
informal interview programme undertaken by the author. More 
than twenty such interviews ranging in length from thirty 
minutes, to two and a half hours, were conducted with members
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of the various committees, ministers, civil servants, 
journalists and committee advisors. A standard questionnaire 
format was not employed because the author favoured an 
informal setting which might in the long run be seen to have 
drawn out valuable and otherwise unavailable information. 
While the substance of those interviews has been incorporated 
throughout the dissertation, sources are unattributable, but 
are indicated by alphabetical lettering. This alphabetical 
format does not correspond to the numerical listing of 
interviewees in the bibliography, and is used merely to show 
that the author has catalogued each fact or opinion.
Parliamentary reform is a broad and complex area which 
encompasses electoral reform, internal/procedural reform 
(standing orders, parliamentary questions, order of business, 
debating rights and the organization of committees), reform 
of political parties, constitutional reform, devolution, and 
reform of the Senate and the Presidency. This dissertation, 
while focussing intermittently on broader aspects of reform, 
primarily looks at internal reform innovations relating to 
the use of select committees. An analysis of parliamentary 
government is not attempted, nor is the intricate 
relationship between the cabinet and the legislature in 
Ireland brought under any particular scrutiny. Instead, this 
dissertation is intended to account for the work of specific 
select committees in the 24th Oireachtas so that their 
usefulness might better be measured.
Note on Methodology:
Where research into parliamentary committees has been 
compiled in countries such as Britain, Canada, France and 
Germany, authors have commonly faced methodological 
difficulties in their efforts to evaluate committee 
performance. At the root of the problem lies the near
impossibility of finding appropriate measures of that
performance. Do we, for example, attempt to evaluate it
quantitatively: by studies of output? -- i.e. the number of 
reports and recommendations produced; or by turnover? -- i.e. 
the number of meetings held and witnesses received, or by the 
success ratio of recommendations? -- i.e. the number which 
reappear in policy documents or in bills on the order paper?
Quantitative evaluations are inconsistent and crude and 
seldom present a true account of committee activity. A
committee which reports prolifically, for example, might 
enjoy efficient and extensive staffing privileges which other 
committees do not. Likewise a high turnover of work might be 
dictated by factors other than a diligent membership and 
recommendations which reappear in later policy documents may 
not have originated within select committee. Quantitative 
measurements of output, turnover, attendance etc., can
nevertheless provide an initial framework for comparison, 
which is useful if treated as a superficial indicator and not
Xas definitive evidence of a committee's success or failure. 
Where considered valid, therefore, minor comparative 
references will be made throughout this dissertation.
The author had hoped to compile comprehensive statistical 
data on attendance however, but decided otherwise due to the 
irregularity of committee publications and the frequency with 
which select committee meetings were held in private. 
Occasional tables have been included nevertheless, and these, 
being based on a sample range of committee meetings, are 
presented as indicators of membership performance. They show 
attendance and the number of questions posed by each member 
of the Dail Commmittee on Public Expenditure and the Joint 
Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies over a range of public 
meetings held between 1983 and 1986. Being intended strictly 
as indicators these tables are not used to support any 
argument or proposition. Membership attendance figures for 
the Joint Committee on Building Land are also presented in 
Table 3. The figures set out in this table are unique 
because they are drawn from every meeting held by this 
committee during the 24th Oireachtas.
Abstract
As a single issue, parliamentary reform has never been given 
priority in the Oireachtas and in the past, reform 
initiatives have been sporadic, minor and less than 
effective. Backbench TDs are prone to lament their status, 
which many perceive as being weak and inapproriate for tasks 
of scrutiny or decision-making. Ostensibly in answer to 
pleas for reform, a disparate assortment of ad hoc select 
committees was set up in 1983. Chapter One describes the 
backround to the new committees and traces the factors which 
conditioned their structure and remit. Chapters Two and 
Three examine the activities of two select committees, their 
composition of membership, their structure and work methods 
and summarise a select sample of their reports. These 
chapters also endeavour to assess the achievements of the 
Dail Committee on Public Expenditure and the Joint Committee 
on State-Sponsored Bodies and suggest minor alterations 
which might improve their method of scrutiny and its 
effectiveness. Chapter Four provides a brief overview of 
other select committees meeting during the 24th Oireachtas. 
A short presentation on media coverage of select committees 
is also included.
The objectives of parliamentary reform are multiple and 
confused. So too were the expectations set for the new 
Oireachtas committees. This was obvious from the fractious 
consultations which determined their structure, the scope of 
their remit and their composition of membership. In 
concluding this review, the effects of select committees on 
the Oireachtas are measured against the original 
expectations set for their work. Finally, the overall 
performance of select committees as tools of parliamentary 
reform is discussed in relation to the political climate 
which governs their existence.
1Reform of the Pail
The case for Dail reform has been espoused by a select group 
of politicians through a combination of public and 
parliamentary speeches, newspaper and journal essays at 
irregular intervals over the last fifteen years. Common to 
each contribution has been a tone of urgency which depicts 
the need for reform as a political or even moral imperative. 
Yet for a movement whose collective membership stands for a 
large proportion of the parliamentary world, it has,
curiously, lacked the cohesion and consistency of approach 
from which results are produced. As one British observer 
remarked on the situation within the House of Commons 
'knowing what is wrong with Parliament is the key to 
reforming it'and within the Irish context, as in many other 
legislatures throughout the world, there is rarely any
synchronised agreement about what is wrong with parliament
and how that 'wrong' should be remedied (1). An informal 
committee on Dail reform which met in 1972 recommended 
thirty-five technical measures designed to modernise Dail 
Standing Orders (2). Of those reforms which were implemented 
many have 1 streamlined some utterly outmoded Dail
procedures'. Overall, however, the effects have been 'minor'
and as 'a long term contribution towards meeting the more
serious defects of Dail procedures, the Report [of the
informal committee] was not a major contribution' (3). Since
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21972, pleas for reform have been made on infrequent
occasions, and rarely,-if ever, at the same time. Even when
single, cross-party motions for reform have been tabled in
the Oireachtas - and there have been only two of significance 
in the last fifteen years - despite attracting widespread 
parliamentary interest, contributions have been rambling, and 
unstructured (4). Without the existence of a well organised 
reform campaign which relies on consistent surveying and 
reporting facilities, such as those sponsored in the past by 
the Study of Parliament Group in Britiain or, at present by 
the All Party House of Commons Reform Group, reform 
initiatives in Ireland will continue to be feeble and 
sporadic.
In his 'memorandum' to the government in 1975, Barry Desmond 
T.D., seeing the pressure for reform as 'drearily 
dispirited', acknowledged that it was never 'likely to 
receive much priority', possibly because the 'minds and
actions of many Deputies and Senators will most likely be
preoccupied with other more seemingly important political 
issues such as their prospects for re-election to the Dail' 
(5).
The message of reform, however dispirited or inconsistently 
put, is fairly obvious. Many of those on the Oireachtas 
backbenches are dissatisfied with their role within the 
overall scheme of government. For them, parliamentary life 
has been characterised in recent decades by an increasing 
number of complex Bills and motions which they pass,
3sheeplike, without effecting any concrete input. The last 
five years alone have seen unprecedented rises in 
expenditure, emigration, unemployment and its associated
social welfare business. Yet in the face of an upward spiral 
in constituency duties, TDs still await qualitative 
improvements to existing parliamentary mechanisms which will 
give them access to decision-making and improve their ability 
to scrutinise executive activity. The factors which caused 
Basil Chubb to depict the Dail as 'one of the worst
organized, equipped and informed parliaments in the 
democratic world1 in 1969, appeared to have remained 
unchanged in 1979 and may yet be seen to have been
exacerbated as we approach 1989 (6).
The Rt. Hon. Julian Critchley's depiction of MPs in the House 
of Commons as powerlessly 'perched high on the backbenches 
like so many battery hens', might instantly be applied to 
describe their Irish counterparts, some of whom have long 
been searching for reform initiatives which will bring them 
closer to realising their elusive constitutional functions 
(7). Those constitutional functions, although clearly set out 
in Bunreacht na hEireann, bear little relation to the 
practical role of the backbencher. In theory, parliament 
exists to legislate. Article 15 (2T1) of Bunreacht na
hEireann provides that the 'sole and exclusive power of 
making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: 
no other legislative authority has the power to make laws for 
the State' (8). In practice, the Westminster model of 
parliament adopted in Ireland finds its leadership in the
4government, and over centuries, that leadership has been 
strengthened within parliament. Today it relies upon, and 
invariably receives, the support of a parliamentary majority 
which is invoked by means of strict party discipline.
Inside the Pail
Parliamentary reform invariably commences with the Dail, 
while reform of the Senate is usually seen in relation to the 
Dail as the dominant partner . Thus, parliamentary reform 
essentially comes to mean Dail reform which can be summarised 
as a quest by TDs for improved working conditions which might 
■bring them closer to realising evasive theoretical and 
constitutional powers. The nature of power
within the Oireachtas is relatively simplified. Power is not 
within the scope of the backbencher; it does not lie in 
choosing the executive, for ministers are promoted from a 
list of the deserving drawn up by the party whips. Nor does 
it lie in formulating legislation. A TD can amend or very 
occasionally influence legislation before it is formally 
presented to the Dail, but Bills are by the manifesto out of 
the civil service. Power does not really lie in dismissing 
the executive, for to do so would be to cultivate political 
and electoral repercussions which many backbench politicians 
might not survive.
Debates in the Oireachtas involve a constant exchange between 
the government and the governed, through their elected 
representatives. The executive states its policy, and
5individual members or groups of members are free to compel a 
full disclosure and explanation, but not to legislate, merely 
to accept or reject a government's proposals. The 
limitations which prevent it from doing so are a combination 
of a number of factors* such as the strict party discipline 
which is a by-product of adversarial politics, or the 
increasing complexity of government business which sees a 
greater volume of highly technical information concentrated 
within the area of the executive. TDs become progressively 
less well informed and their generalist skills become 
inadequate for the exacting task of scrutinising the 
executive. This situation is possibly exacerbated by the 
traditional Irish routes to the Dail, which, tending to 
predispose candidates towards local issues rather than 
matters of national policy as they do, may not develop 
professional competence in understanding and supporting the 
legislative process.
The movement for Dail reform in Ireland - if it may be called 
that, for very few politicians actually pursued the issue as 
a lobby interest - arose primarily in response to a perceived 
lack of parliamentary powers. While it seeks to improve many 
areas of Oireachtas affairs, including practical aspects of 
the work environment, such as secretarial facilities, 
provision of accomodation, restaurant services and so on, its 
ultimate objective relates to closer scrutiny of the 
executive and increasing backbencher influence over policy 
formulation and decision making. In pursuit of this, those 
who cared to look abroad for inspiration and instruction
6instantly recognised that other legislatures had long since 
initiated extensive reforms: Canada and Great Britain started 
in the late 1960s and Germany, Switzerland, France and Italy 
even earlier. After only elementary investigation, it became 
apparent that the conduct of business in the Oireachtas was 
archaic when compared with practices abroad.
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The late 1960s and ^  1970s in Britain witnessed a general 
remodelling of parliamentary procedures: staffing and
secretarial facilities were improved; radio broadcasting was 
introduced into the House of Commons, later to be developed 
into edited television broadcasting for the House of Lords; 
Standing Orders were amended in the area of Parliamentary 
Questions and so on. But what can be seen to be the most 
significant development lay in the extension of the use of 
select committees (9). Members of the House of Commons in 
Britain were broadly impressed with the achievements of the 
American congressional and senatorial committees which are 
'industrious, numerous, self-contained, permanent and 
influential1 (10). The House of Representatives and the 
Senate are often viewed as though made up of a great number 
of self-reliant machines, operating independently of one 
another. These machines have proven useful and even 
indispensable in the American context and elsewhere. Hence a 
network of committees examining vast areas of governmental 
affairs, ranging from nationalised industries to race 
relations, was set up in Britain. After decades of 
experimentation, modern committee systems have been moulded 
to accomodate the interests of those occupying the
7backbenches in Britain, New Zealand, Australia and Canada. 
Those interested in committees as a tool of parliamentary 
reform in Ireland have had ample opportunity to study 
precedents set abroad in an effort to avoid mistakes.
A definite, permanent structure was only properly devised in 
Britain in 1979 when twelve departmentally-related select 
committees replaced most of the existing committees in the 
House of Commons (11). For nearly twenty years, select 
committees in Britain had trailed haphazardly along without 
any proper co-ordination. They were commonly referred to as 
a 'hotch-potch' without any systematic pattern, and were once 
described as 1 a patchwork quilt which covers part of the 
administrative bed much more completely than is needed and 
does not cover other parts at all' (12). In 1979, the 
Conservative Government in Britain - never traditionally 
considered a friend to select committees - introduced a more 
structured system which was departmentally related. In 
practice, the new system results in the appointment at the 
beginning of each new term of a Commons select committee to 
monitor each government department. On announcing the new 
reforms in 1979, Mr St John-Stevas, the then Leader of the 
Commons, declared the House of Commons to be 'embarking on a 
series of changes which could constitute the most important 
parliamentary reforms of the century' (13).
The merits of the 'departmentally related' system, which are 
said to be coherence and continuity, are considered 
irrelevant within the Irish context for a number of reasons.
8Firstly, because few ministers would tolerate a single 
committee dogging their movements. Secondly, because the 
nature of the relationship which might develop between a 
minister and a departmentally related select committee is 
commonly feared (14). It is anticipated that such
relationships would probably tilt between antagonism on the 
one hand, in which case committee work would not progress, or 
sympathy and fraternity on the other. Both situations would 
impair a committee's ability to be impartial and exacting.
Aside from the merits of the specific type of systems, i.e. 
departmentally related or not, which might have been
considered for adoption by the Oireachtas, it seemed 
inevitable that select committees of any type would produce 
very different results in Ireland to those achieved in
Britain or elsewhere. Apart from the different political 
contexts in which legislatures operate, the institutional 
structures and other factors which condition their work are 
quite divergent. The Oireachtas is far smaller than the
House of Commons for example, and the electoral preconditions 
in each country, both in terms of the system and the
influences, differ greatly. The traditional role for MPs and 
TDs are dissimilar as are party demands and inter-party
relationships. Career structures for MPs in Britain follow
different paths to their Irish counterparts; whereas many MPs 
might not aspire to a cabinet role, choosing instead to 
become professional parliamentarians, Irish TDs would 
retain an open mind wherever possible.
9Other structural and demographic factors distinguish these 
particular two parliaments from each other. Government 
machinery is more extensive in Britain. Being a larger 
country it has far greater administrative workloads. The 
prospect of delegating small responsibilities to committees, 
standing or select, in areas where there is minimum
contention, is often welcomed by the executive in Britain, 
while in Ireland cabinet supremacy is cautiously guarded 
against any slight erosion. The system in Britain has had 
centuries of growth and development to sustain it, 
and the gradualness with which modernization has been
controlled, has eased an accomodation of the needs and 
demands, if not of its people, then at least of its
politicians. The parliamentary system in Ireland might 
benefit more from indigenous development and experimentation 
than from wholesale adoption of British mechanisms.
Advantages of Select Committees
Irish politicians, predominantly from the Fine Gael and 
Labour parties,_ have long advocated the use of select 
committees in the Dail as a means of equipping the 
backbencher with information which could improve the range of 
his influence. The proposing of an efficient committee
system supportive of the legislative process, while possibly 
of great advantage to government in the long run, may in the 
short term be viewed suspiciously as a potential threat to
10
the executive supremacy so inherent in the Westminster model 
of government. Strong select committees do not blend easily 
with this constitutional model which sees cabinet as the 
centre of power. In their search for information, they
utilise powers of scrutiny which inevitably inhibit 
government behaviour.
Measured against a backround of feasible internal 
parliamentary reforms, select committees were nevertheless 
seen to have considerable merits to commend them. It is 
evident from contributions to a debate on reform held in 
January 1983, and in the occasional policy documents
addressing the issue, that the choice to extend the use of 
select committees in the Oireachtas was made with high
expectations for their work (15). In summary, they were as 
follows:
-- that the Dail should be able to off-load more and more of 
its work to them, in particular that they could be a device 
for regional devolution, where TDs from each region gather to 
discuss issues relevant to their province,
-- that access to detailed information, interrogation of 
departmental officials and other witnesses would have an 
educative value for backbench members of the Oireachtas, 
which would effect an improvement in the quality of
participation on the floor of the House, where ministers 
might be challenged on a near equal footing,
11
-- that a more sophisticated form of accountability would be 
achieved and that the public service would be seen to be 
directly answerable to the public, through parliament,
that ministers would have to account for their actions 
doubly, i.e. not only to the Dail, but also to committee,
that committees would provide a forum for discussion 
without the party political complications which affect 
debates within the Dail,
that, as a consequence, the parliamentary process would 
take on a more professional image and TDs would feel greater 
dignity and esteem in the performance of their duties.
Ultimately it was expected that in reporting and making 
recommendations, the committees would play a significant role 
in policy formulation, thus allowing TDs to exercise their 
constitutional rights as legislators.
The realisation of such expectations rests on a number of 
assumptions: namely that the executive are prepared to extend
full support and co-operation commencing with instant
improvements in staffing and secretarial facilities. This
alone would require a substantial increase in the
appropriation to the Houses of the Oireachtas. The effective 
use of a vast range of new committees also presupposes the 
physical/logistical availability of membership; general
12
parliamentary support for their work; backing for
recommmendations and a non partisan approach by the 
membership who in turn would require a minimum of electoral 
recognition for their work. Experience in legislatures abroad 
suggests that the hallmarks of an effective select committee 
is its non partisan approach; the examination of detail; the 
disclosing of facts of a case and its ability to advise 
members of parliament. Usually it performs duties for which 
the body of the non-'& - in Ireland's case, all 166
members - is unsuited to do, and it should do so in a manner
which tends to mute party differences. Without the essential 
preconditions listed above, any attempts to develop an 
effective committee system would be thwarted.
Significant debates on Dail reform, held in 1973, 1976 and
1983, revealed a consensus which favoured the expansion of
the Oireachtas system of select committees. The most
adventurous initiative in their use began in 1983. The
factors which influenced the origin of each committee are
described below.
Terms of Reference
The scope of any select committee investigation is determined 
by the orders of reference or rules by which it works. These 
are framed by the executive and not by a committee's 
membership. Apart from one exception, the Joint Committee on
13
Womens Rights, which was developed in its early stages by 
Nuala Fennell, Minister of State at the Department of the 
Taoiseach, the administrative responsibilities for the 
committees set up in 1983 fell mostly to John Bruton's staff 
at the Department of Industry and Commerce. Their role was 
to conceive a structure and purpose for each one within a 
timespan of only a few months: the relevant debate on Dail
reform took place in January 1983, and the committees were 
expected to be in operation before June of that year. The 
troublesome preparatory work for so many committees at once 
was exacerbated by the haste in which it was conducted.
Although committees have been used intermittently in the 
Oireachtas since 1922, only seven are reappointed by standing 
order at the start of each new Dail. They are the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), the Dail and Seanad Procedure and 
Privileges (PPC) and Selection (SC) Committees and the Joint 
Committee on Secondary Legislation of the EEC (2ndLC) which 
was provided for under the European Communities (Amendment) 
Act, 1973. The potential for using the structures of such 
traditional committees as precedent for the new models was 
limited. The coalition government, having agreed to improve 
outmoded parliamentary mechanisms in 1983, were not 
encouraged to adopt old procedures under new titles. The ad 
hoc manner in which the system was to be extended complicated 
the task of devising useful structures and orders of 
reference. The search for powers and structures which would 
help meet the multiple expectations set for each committee 
was a much debated and controversial process. Although
14
ultimately the cabinet had the final veto, there was
extensive consultation with the opposition parties through 
the whips and the leaders of both Houses.
Functions
Unlike standing committees, which are set up to carry out 
duties in a fixed way and without the power to display
initiative, select committees are largely masters of their 
own proceedings : they devise their own agenda and decide how 
to set about the task they have been given. While all select 
committees share common characteristics, the Oireachtas
distinguishes between them in deciding how much freedom each 
receives through the powers delegated to it. Examination by 
select committee is additional to the legislative process. 
It covers a broad variety of subject matters which can be 
summarised as follows:
Investigative -- to establish the facts of a matter and make 
recommendations,
Overseeing -- a special subject such as commercial
state-sponsored bodies, women's rights, or building land,
Quasi judicial -- to consider a case of privilege and receive 
witnesses,
Domestic - - to make arrangements for the greater convenience 
of members,
15
Legislative -- to examine the finer details of a bill 
and recommend amendments.
The principal characteristic of all select committees is the 
power to send for persons, papers and records. This enables 
them to investigate, to hear witnesses, to assemble facts and 
generally to conduct the inquiry with which they have been 
charged. A committee will consult with anyone it thinks may 
help it. Recent innovations allow it to set up 
sub - committees, appoint specialists, sit when the House is in 
recess, and adjourn from place to place, including abroad if 
it sees fit. Select committees are competent to deal with 
organizations and individuals outside the House.
Sending for papers and records can prove difficult, insofar 
as access can be restricted to documents which do not concern 
policy or other matters considered to be 'secret' or 
important to national security. Internal departmental files 
or minutes are usually not made available unless by express 
permission of the relevant minister, in observance e|- the 
Official Secrets Act, 1963 which states that
A person shall not communicate any official 
information to any other person unless he is duly 
authorised to do so or does so in the course of 
and in accordance with his duties as the holder 
of a public office or when it is his duty in the 
interest of the State to communicate it (16).
In such circumstances 'official information' is defined as:
any secret official code word or password, and 
any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document
16
or information which is secret or confidential or 
which is expressed to be either (17).
In practice these limitations translate into information
being made available to committee only with ministerial
sanction, which in turn ensures that committees consider
administrative matters sooner than policy. Some committees
are excluded from considering policy as a natural consequence
of their function, i.e. the PAC exists to examine
departmental accounts, not the policy which determines them.
But other committees do not have this natural limitation and
their work often enables them to look equally at policy and
administration. It is such committees which the executive
sometimes attempts to confound.
Even though the consideration of policy issues does not have 
the sanction of express statutory provision and the executive 
would in principle oppose any attempts to do so, certain 
committees have nevertheless developed their own in-house 
style of inquiry which tentatively borders on policy 
evaluation. For example, the Public Expenditure Committee 
(PEC), which was set up to review public expenditure planning 
and management, has at times expanded its remit to review
factors which condition expenditure. Likewise, the Joint 
Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies (SSBC) often extends its 
inquiries beyond the day-to-day operations of the commercial 
state sector to include policy issues relating to their 
administration. As a rule, however, policy and its scrutiny 
remains firmly within the grasp of the government and
committees are free only to examine its effects.
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All select committees are empowered to report, some from time 
to time on their progress and others to conclude their 
specialist inquiry. Unlike in Britain, Irish select 
committees are not entitled to official governmental 
responses to their reports, except the PAC which receives a 
somewhat informal reply to their recommendations entitled the 
'Minute from the Minister of Finance'. This 'Minute' which 
includes fairly general commentary from the department of 
finance, is published as an appendix to later PAC reports. 
The PEC have occasionally prevailed upon government 
departments to reply to their recommendations and criticisms 
by continuously requesting a formal or informal response. AllA
other committees are free to pursue similiar responses, and, 
in the event of refusal, their members might choose to table 
parliamentary questions as an alternative. Left to 
themselves, select committees have a certain influence but 
little power. To have real success, a committee depends on 
the Dail to endorse its findings and lobby in support of its 
recommendations.
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Power to Recommend
In very general terms each committee receives a remit which 
reflects cabinet expectations for its work. Naturally those 
expectations vary from individual to individual. Even at 
senior party level, diverse and ambiguous motives often lie 
behind the appointment of new committees. The widespread 
confusion which surrounded the framing of the terms of 
reference for committees set up in 1983 was inevitable. 
Interview evidence suggests that elements within the cabinet 
expected the new committees to act as a measure of political 
opinion (18). They sought to withhold the power to appoint 
specialists so that committee members would return verdicts 
based on political judgement rather than expert advice. This 
strategy was resisted by committee members whose duty it was 
to carry out the actual work. Already the work of a 
backbencher was conditioned by great party and constituency 
pressures. Aside from fundamental limits on time and 
resources, many of the specialist issues arising for 
examination by committee were steeped in technical 
complexities which would hamper those with only rudimentary 
expertise. Understandably the view was adopted that any 
experiment with select committees would fail without adequate 
specialist help and guidance.
This preference, expressed by the executive, for a network of 
committees deprived of specialist assistance, betrays a 
degree of distrust in their relationship with the Dail. A
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cynical interpretation might suggest that the executive 
considers committee members to be impressionable targets for 
persuasive experts. Another view might question whether the 
executive itself is apprehensive of defending policy to House 
members who are well briefed on the facts of a case. Either 
interpretation gives credence to the old adage which sees 
knowledge as power.
Not every participant in the 1983 reforms favoured an 
extensive delegation of powers to select committees. More 
than a few shared the government's conservative expectations 
for their work, and a minority were fearful of the adopted 
reform strategy which they considered to be overgenerous. 
Many feared possible intrusions into policy matters and 
sought to avoid harmful precedents which might affect them in 
office later or lead to policy changes which they disagreed 
with. Those on the Marriage Breakdown Committee (MBC) who 
held a principled opposition to divorce wanted only limited 
terms of reference to condition their work; in particular 
they resisted the introduction of powers of recommendation. 
On 3 October, 1984 there was a hastily assembled meeting of 
the committee. There were 5 members present including the 
chairman, Willie O'Brien. Deputies Padraig Flynn, Maire 
Geoghan-Quinn, Rory O'Hanlon, and Senator Tom Hussey, made up 
the Quorum. It was the first time there was a Fianna Fail 
majority present. A motion was rushed through debarring the 
committee from making recommendations at all. The original 
official terms of reference had enabled the committee 'to
20
consider every aspect of the matter including whether any 
legislation or constitutional changes were necessary' (19). 
The effect of the Fianna Fail motion was to limit the 
committees' powers. Where previously it might have issued 
recommendations now it could only express opinions and 
observations.
The general ambiguity of approach displayed by the Fianna 
Fail party as a whole, and its representatives on the MBC, 
suggests that many of its members would have preferred the 
issue of marriage breakdown to remain out of the spotlight 
altogether. Charles Haughey as leader of the opposition was 
in open disagreement with the then Taoiseach, Garret 
Fitgerald, over whether the committee had been empowered to 
make recommendations. It is not inconceivable that certain 
members of the MBC committee had enlisted for the inquiry 
solely to counter and oppose any pro divorce sentiment which 
might emerge from proceedings. Against a backround of 
constant media coverage and acute public awareness, the terms 
of reference received by the MBC and the expectations set for 
its work, could not but give rise to controversy.
Disputes about terms of reference were not confined to the 
MBC. Several members of the Joint Committee on Legislation 
(LC) lobbied strenuously for powers of recommendation which 
the cabinet preferred to withhold (20). A minority within 
the Public Expenditure Committee (PEC), while not contesting 
the powers enshrined in its terms of reference, certainly 
disputed their interpretation. Those who opposed what the
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experiment with select committees was trying to achieve, and 
many did, condemned all aspects of its work which might 
intrude on matters of policy.
General Powers
The following is a brief overview of the powers delegated to 
the select committees set up in 1983. Of the ten newly
established committees at work during the 24th Oireachtas, 
the Joint Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies (SSBC), the 
Women's Rights Committee (WRC), the Public Expenditure 
Committee (PEC), the Joint Committee on Small Businesses, 
(SBC), the Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism Committee (CLVC), 
the Joint Committee on Co-operation with Developing Countries 
(CDCC), the Marriage Breakdown Committee (MBC), the Joint 
Committee on Building Land (BLC), the Joint Committee on the 
Irish Language (ILC), and the Joint Committee on Legislation 
(LC), all received the following general powers:
to send for persons, papers, and records, 
to meet in public,
to appoint specialists, _ — -
to report to both Houses, 
to recommend,
to print and publish documents as they saw fit.
The PEC, LC, and the BLC, like the Joint Committee on 
Secondary Legislation of the EEC (2ndLC), which was set up in 
1973, and the longstanding Joint Services Committee (JSC),
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received the power to appoint subcommittees. An additional 
provision guaranteed that each PEC report would be debated in 
the Dail within twelve sitting days, that it should produce a 
progress report annually, and that members of the government 
and Ministers of State be notified of meetings and be allowed 
to attend and take part in proceedings without having a right 
to vote. Such provisions were unprecedented.
The CLVC and the CDCC, like the 2ndLC before them, received 
the power to appoint substitutes who could vote in place of 
full-time members.
The CLVC, WRC, BLC and the LC received the express power to 
examine or propose legislative measures which related to 
their remit.
Both the BLC and the MBC were given specific time limits by 
which to report back to the House. Both extended their 
reporting-back dates considerably.
These powers were agreed upon immediately prior to the 
appointment of each new committee in 1983 in a hasty and 
confusing preparatory process which went through several 
stages, each a modification of the last. The original 
blueprint of powers devised by John Bruton was apparantly 
different to anything that had gone before. The finer details 
of his proposals were never published, but the content might 
be surmised from commentary emerging from the Dail and 
Seanad. Evidently the original document floundered somewhere
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between cabinet and senior civil service appraisals and the 
floor of the House. Michael Begley, looking at a final draft 
in the Dail asked why 'there are many gaps in this document, 
[meaning the proposals for the extension of the committee 
system], as compared with the original document. Has the 
dentist got at it? Have the main teeth been pulled from the 
original document?' (21). Interview evidence suggests that 
teeth had indeed been pulled from John Bruton's original 
proposal, and not by a single dentist (22).
The nature of what was excised had probably to do with reform 
of backup services to committees rather than delegation of 
powers. John Bruton, Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
supported by the Labour party and Fine Gael junior ministers 
sought sanction from the cabinet to cushion the new 
committees with a large pool of essential resources from 
which they could draw staffing, research and publicity 
services. He was also concerned with establishing a
guarantee of returns for those who invested time and effort. 
With this in mind, the committments and assurances for
co-operation sought from cabinet colleagues and their senior
civil service staff were not entirely successful and
compromise on the original proposals was unavoidable if the 
reforms In general were to be implemented.
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Staffing and General Resources
The provision of staffing and general resources, such as 
accommodation, secretarial, recording, editing and 
publishing, created administrative difficulties primarily for 
the staff within Leinster House and for their sponsor at the 
Department of the Public Service. Even prior to the 
introduction of the new committees, existing resources in 
Leinster House were strained and overutilised. Moreover, 
there was an acute shortage in manpower from which to draw 
committee staff. Consequently officials were 'borrowed' from 
civil service departments and seconded to particular 
committees. But there were limits to the number of staff who 
could be recruited in this way. Few departments wanted to 
volunteer or relinquish their own officials, especially if 
committee work might involve conducting controversial 
investigative research into their parent department (23).
Against a background of scarce resources and departmental 
sensitivities, not every new committee received its ideal 
complement of staff. In the main, however, most did quite 
well, especially compared with longrunning select committees 
like the PAC. However, although chronically understaffed, 
that committee has not suffered 'in its ... atrophied and 
antiquated condition' a 'complete eclipse' by the 'new 
parliamentary committees, with their ostensibly relevant 
remits and their eager membership1  ^ ( 2 4 ) . The PACs
performance for 1983 to 1987 will be developed in a later 
chapter.
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Immunity
The power to send for persons, papers and records does not 
equip a committee to sub-poena those witnesses who are 
reluctant to attend, for this is a complicated issue which is 
bound up with the question of privilege. The 1976 
'Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Privilege and 
Procedures) Act' provided members of the Dail and Seanad with 
the same immunity and privilege in committee as they enjoy in 
the House. The issue of immunity for witnesses in committees 
was never clarified, however, even for those committees which 
are governed by statute. In 1970/71 the proceedings of the 
PAC inquiry into alleged arms purchases became the subject of 
a High Court ruling which convicted a witness for refusing to 
co-operate with a PAC inquiry (25). Even though the Supreme 
Court overruled the High Court judgement and the witness was 
not sentenced, the case may have had lasting discouraging 
effects for future witnesses, particularly civil servants who 
fear the publicity surrounding controversial committee 
inquiries. In the event of a witness refusing to attend, 
select committees do not have the power to sub-poena 
evidence.
Many civil servants regard the submission of oral evidence to 
committees with suspicion, and developments in recent years 
have not served to allay their fears. In 1981, when 
allegations of phone tapping in the Oireachtas became the 
subject of a select committee inquiry, the issue of immunity
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for witnesses raised its head once again. On this occasion 
the Dail Committee on Procedure and Privileges (PPC) sought 
evidence from senior civil servants at the Department of the 
Taoiseach concerning the installation of SL-1 telephone 
consoles with override facilities in government buildings. 
Soon after the 1981 election, incoming ministers noticed a 
new telephone facility which allowed them to tap into 
conversations from other cabinet offices. A new system had 
been installed during the previous administration with the 
alleged purpose of monitoring cabinet offices. It fell to 
the PPC to establish the true origin and objective of the 
telephone facility. Officials who were called to give 
evidence were concerned about their status as witnesses: 
would their evidence be admissable in a personal or 
professional capacity, and could they expect immunity from 
prosecution if their actions were deemed to have been 
illegal? The Association of Higher Civil Servants (AHCS) 
sought clarification from the PPC, which despite its 
eagerness to accomodate AHCS interests, could not guarantee 
immunity for witnesses. Acting on legal advice the AHCS 
instructed its members not to attend the hearings (26).
It was not by accident that witnesses were excluded from 
immunity in committee, for the 1976 Committees of the Houses 
of the Oireachtas, (Procedures and Privileges) Bill, as 
originally introduced, did include them among the 
identifiable groups of persons protected by privilege and 
immunity. The 1976 Act as passed does not. It provides that 
any utterance in or before a committee, or any document,
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including official reports and publications, should be 
privileged. The- reference to witnesses was specifically 
removed during the passage of the Bill through the Dail. To 
include them now would require the amendment of existing 
legislation.
Fear of giving evidence to select committees affected 
witnesses other than civil servants. Several private 
businessmen and public servants sought legal advice when 
requested to submit evidence to the Joint Committee on State 
Sponsored Bodies (SSBC) during the inquiry into Udaras na 
Gaeltachta. They, like the civil servants before them, were 
advised not to attend hearings (27).
It is not clear how widely the case for amending the 1976 Act 
is supported in the Oireachtas, but those who oppose select 
committee investigative work might welcome the legal 
loopholes which restrict access to evidence and therefore 
obstruct a committee's power of scrutiny. Even prior to the 
1983 experiment, the Dail had been warned by Michael Begley 
who spoke in favour of amending the 1976 Act. He predicted 
that 'the select committees which are to be set up will not 
be worth anything unless immunity is given to key witnesses 
who attend the hearings. By that I mean that they will not 
suffer because they have the guts to come forward and tell a 
select committee that money is being misappropriated in 
certain areas' (28). Begley was at that time awaiting
ivaluable evidence from a man in Kerry who is prepared to 
give me classified information on how he sees money being
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spent1. Begley sought 'assurance that he will not be
victimised the minute the findings of the committee are
completed. That assurance will have to be written into the
workings of these select committees' (29). It was not, and
although John Bruton, Minister for Industry and Commerce, hadA
taken steps to introduce a Bill to amend the 1976 Act, it had 
not appeared before the dissolution of the 24th Dail.
After provisional drafts of Bruton's new Bill were completed, 
it became clear that reforms were envisaged which went 
further than affording immunity to witnesses. The most 
important of these related to a committee's need to sub-poena 
reluctant witnesses. Such a provision was highly contentious 
due to its quasi-judicial nature, for compelling a witness to 
attend implies the power to punish those who do not. In an 
effort to offset probable contention, it was proposed that 
all requests to sub-poena witnesses would be made, on advice 
from the Attorney General, to the Dail itself, and that 
witnesses would receive immunity only after formal request 
(30).
Although minor, it is likely that such reforms would have 
faced a difficult passage through the Dail. The sheer 
practicalities of applying directly to the Dail for 
permission to sub-poena witnesses would undoubtedly prove 
time-consuming and open to party-political manipulation. 
Neverthless, such a Bill, if passed into law, would have
A
contributed in some way to resolving the uncertain status of 
select committees.
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Membership
Appointments to committees - specialist and investigative- 
are formally channelled through the two Selection Committees, 
one in either house, which are composed of party whips and 
others linked to party organisation. During the 24th 
Oireachtas for example, the chief whips of the three leading 
parties: Bertie Ahern, Fianna Fail, Sean Barrett, Fine Gael, 
and Mervyn Taylor, Labour, played a vital role in the 
proceedings of the Dail Selection Committee (DSC), which is 
traditionally chaired by a Minister of State from the 
Department of the Taoiseach. Select Committee chairmen, 
together with the whips, liaise with the executive on matters 
concerning the composition, remit and staffing of committees. 
It is through such consultations that the cabinet endeavour 
to protect their interests.
The Dail and Seanad committees work in tandem, performing 
similar duties in nominating their House members to serve on 
standing or select committees. Formal nomination is brought 
forward by the Leaders in both Houses. Although selection 
committees are empowered to discharge members for poor 
attendance, in practice those with low attendance records are 
likely to ask to leave before proceedings are brought against 
them. Evidence suggests that selection committees typically 
fail to exercise the power to discharge members when they 
might. In his article on the PAC, Eunan O'Halpin referred to 
one senior PAC member who served between 1973 and 1980, 
during which time the committee held one hundred and two
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meetings, of which 'he attended a total of twenty seven, and 
for three years running did not come to a single one1 (31).
Attendance and participation tables set out in chapters two, 
three and four provide some indication of the participation 
habits of select committee members (32). These 'tables' are 
based on limited data derived from those minutes of evidence 
which were actually published. Due to considerable staffing 
and editorial difficulties affecting the new committees, huge 
discrepancies exist in the sequence of their publications, 
which are in any case only ever available for public 
hearings. Private hearings, while usually recorded, are 
never reported on in Oireachtas literature. The figures set 
out in tables 1-4 should be seen therefore as basic 
indicators and not as absolute attendance and participation 
records.
Evidence set out in these tables also suggests that both the 
Dail and the Seanad selection committees failed to exercise 
their powers of discharge when they might have. There were 
seventeen committees at work during the 24th Oireachtas, 
however: inevitably this caused difficulties for those
members with multiple committee assignments as well as 
generally overtaxing staffing and even accomodation 
resources.
The committees reflect the party political breakdown of the 
House. Party membership is thus the primary determinant of 
committee assignments. The government party(ies) will always
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occupy the majority quota of committee seats. It is after 
the assignments are proportionally distributed among the 
parties that the more vital process of selection begins. 
Decisions at this stage are taken within each party without 
reference to the selection committees. These internal party
appointments are of great importance in determining the
quality of membership received by each committee. A
provisional list of prospective committees is circulated by 
the party whip and candidates then present themselves for the 
areas of their choice.
The new system, being experimental, was fraught with 
difficulties, especially since official statements were often 
unclear and sometimes contradictory. Delays and confusion 
about the number and scope of committees to be set up led 
some to expect a broad investigative agenda which included
their own preferences. Months later, they remained without 
placement having foregone other assignments in expectation of 
select committees which never materialised (33).
The degree of controversy and prestige attached to a 
committee's subject determines the level of competition for 
appointments. Those with a high media or parliamentary 
profile generate most cross party interest and competition. 
This injects a healthy enthusiasm into proceedings in 
general, for having volunteered or competed for an assignment 
members approach their work with a willingness which improves 
the quality of participation. Less popular committees 
sometimes fail to draw sufficient support, thus forcing the
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party whip or the committee's sponsor - a Minister or 
prominent frontbencher - to seek out volunteers who are not 
slow to interpret invitations as a veiled attempt to make up 
the numbers. At least two TDs refused to enrol with the 
Irish Language Committee, despite being directly invited by 
the then Minister for the Gaelteacht, Patrick O'Toole (34).
Politicians have, by necessity, widely diverse interests 
which do not necessarily correlate to their constituency 
remit; yet a committee on agriculture would still attract 
deputies with vested interests in matters agricultural or 
rural. The prospects of establishing moderate objectivity or 
neutrality, which are essential characteristics of a 
politically acceptable select committee, are thus endangered. 
This points to the need for a careful and discriminating 
selection process.
Ad hoc, 'specialist' committees - which are merely 
alternative titles for select committees which examine 
specialist subjects - invariably result from parliamentary 
party pressure and those who express most interest in setting 
up a committee usually go on to compose its membership panel. 
Controversial issues, by their very nature, will not reach 
committee stage without inspiring pro and anti lobbies. 
Committees beset by pro and anti faction fighting can, at 
best, hope to achieve consensus, if they do not end in 
stalemate.
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The selection duties facing whips are not straightforward. 
Usually they act on instructions from the party leaders, who 
are engaged in sometimes fitful 'consultation' with the 
opposition. Three factors dominate such consultations: the 
content of each remit, the choice of chairman and the scope 
of powers to be delegated. John Bruton, the then Minister 
for Industry and Commerce, heading the negotiations for the 
coalition government in 1983, received numerous demands from 
Fianna Fail in exchange for their support. Privately, Fianna
Fail were apprehensive of the prospect of investigative
committees, particularly those on Marriage Breakdown and 
Public Expenditure. Charles Haughey, TD and leader of the
opposition, who was eager to participate in the proposed
review of Womens Rights (WRC), offered to exchange full
co-operation from his party for the Marriage Breakdown 
Committee if he could chair the former. Prior to any 
agreement being finalised, details were leaked to the Sunday 
Tribune, and the ensuing controversy necessitated an entirely 
new arrangement (35) . Eventually Maire Geoghegan-Quinn, 
Fianna Fail, was appointed chairperson of the WRC, and an 
additional two committees, one investigating the role of the 
Irish Language, the other on Crime, Lawlessness and 
Vandalism, were set up at FF's insistence (36).
The great importance attached to the selection of chairperson 
appointments are dictated at senior party level and the 
election procedure within committee is purely formal - 
confirms the assumption that his/her input can influence the
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outcome of a committee's work significantly. Compared with 
the American, German or even British models, however, Irish 
chairmen exercise little power. While they enjoy similar
rights, such as the right to direct proceedings, set the 
agenda, meet privately with witnesses, liase with the
executive, the media and other committees and to control
expenditure, they do so in an environment which lacks the 
degree of respect and deference to their office which is 
enjoyed elsewhere.
Because a committee has virtually no influence over the 
selection of its chairperson, the office can become a 
strategic tool for the party leadership. Usually the chair 
of a select committee is highly sought after, particularly 
amongst parliamentary specialists in the area of finance, 
legislation and family law. Hence numerous candidates 
present themselves for a single office, and certain selection 
or eliminatory criteria are brought to bear. Out of
seventeen committees in the 24th Oireachtas, eleven chairmen 
were from government parties and six from the opposition. 
Certain committees, such as the PAC, and the Joint Committee 
on Secondary^Legislation of the EEC, are traditionally chaired 
by a member from the opposition. Government party(ies) have 
no influence over appointees from the opposition and vice 
versa. Selection, therefore, remains an internal party 
affair. The criteria used to select candidates are diverse 
and difficult to pinpoint; opposition parties are concerned 
to deploy their shadow cabinet strategically, while governing 
party(ies) can use appointments to select committees as a
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reward to deserving backbenchers. Obvious factors such as 
parliamentary experience and seniority, so important in 
American committees, hardly feature in the Oireachtas. Party 
loyalty, constituency origin, qualities of leadership, 
association with lobby issues, expertise and sex are 
contributory factors which vary from party to party and 
depend on the nature of the subject at hand. Usually a 
chairman gets appointed if it is considered to be his turn 
and in exceptional circumstances if all other candidates are 
seen to be too fervently involved with the subject under 
inquiry.
With specialist committees, those who have most expertise or 
association with pro or anti lobby groups are the least 
likely to be appointed to the chair, for to do so would 
possibly impair a committee's reputation for objectivity 
before it tackled its remit. Consequently, such individuals 
- often seeing themselves as the natural chairman - uneasily
make do with a backbench role. This augurs badly for the
appointed chairman who may require great skill, diplomacy and 
patience to deal with frequent challenges to his authority 
and leadership.
Many committee chairmen, despite their pre-selection by the
party leaders, approach their work as objectively and
independently as possible. By all accounts, most committees 
determine their agenda collectively; they make decisions on 
how to conduct inquiries and judge which witnesses to call 
and when. While chairmen introduce and lead proceedings,
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they always defer to their colleagues or else face frequent 
interruption. To each committee come a core group of 
dedicated and consistent participants who structure and 
co-ordinate inquiries up to report stage. Several versions 
of a report, which may or may not have been compiled by the 
chairman working with committee advisory staff, are discussed 
at great length. All committee members are free to present 
their own reports for discussion and they often do. 
Nevertheless, each chairman enjoys considerable advantage
over his colleagues, for, having invested more time with 
advisory personnel, he is usually better briefed. Should he 
choose to do so, and many do not, he has ample opportunity to 
stamp his personality onto committee work until it becomes 
indelibly associated with his political career.
As committees adapt to their environment so too do chairmen
and each brings a different style and approach to similiar 
work; some assume 1groupleader1 roles whilst others sit back 
to adjudicate or mediate. In general, most become leaders 
rather than mediators, which betrays more about the selection 
process than it does about the individual politician. Two 
chairmen may be responsible for committees with identical
powers yet choose to use them differently. However 
restricting the terms of reference available to him, a 
chairman can exert great dominance over committee inquiries. 
Likewise, his political successes or failures may become 
synonymous with a committee's reputation. One active and 
committed chairman, Michael Keating T.D., who recorded one of 
the highest attendance and participation ratios in committees
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evaluated during the 24th Oireachtas, fell from favour within 
his own party and defected to another. Party-political 
differences may have reflected badly on the PEC itself. 
Despite a high output and^thorough approach to its remit, it 
was not reconstituted in the 25th Oireachtas.
Expertise
It is not clear whether those responsible for allocating 
assignments to the new select committees gave priority to 
professional expertise. In his study of appointments to the 
PAC, O'Halpin could draw 'only one conclusion: membership is 
imposed upon TDs by the party whips on a basis of strict 
rotation qualified by internal party exigency' (37). The 
availability of membership for select committees is largely 
affected by the nature of their remit. If the whips are 
obliged to impose assignments on reluctant deputies due to a 
lack of suitable volunteers it is indicative of that 
committee's prestige. Where competition for places on 
committees does exist, expertise becomes an important 
criteria for selection.
Larger parties have, by definition, a bigger pool of 
resources from which to draw the necessary expertise. Smaller 
parties experience particular difficulties if they happen 
also to be members of a coalition government. In this 
instance, the party leadership, who tend also to be the most 
experienced and professionally qualified, are caught up in 
ministerial duties and so unavailable for committee work.
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There were notable exceptions where ministers did participate 
on committees; Ruari Quinn, Minister of State at the 
Department of the Environment during the 24th Oireachtas, was 
also a member of the Joint Committee on Building Land( while 
the Minister for Industry and Commerce, John Bruton,^a member 
of the Dail committee on Procedure and Privileges. Specific 
provisions were written into the terms of reference in each 
of these cases, mostly because both individuals were closely 
involved with the specific area of interest and their 
presence was deemed essential (38).
Smaller parties have no difficulties meeting their quota of 
places on committees, which is proportional to the size of 
the parliamentary party. The dilemma lies in finding 
candidates with a relevant expertise and sufficient interest 
to participate.
Membership on a committee, particularly one with a specialist 
remit, compels a degree of committment beyond the usual call 
of duty. Certain complex and technical investigations test 
the skills if not the patience of all involved. At such 
times most rely on consultancy or advisory staff, but such 
assistance is relevant only insofar as the member himself can 
make it so. A professional qualification is of added value 
both to the deliberations and hearings of the committee and 
to the use to which conclusions are put politically. While a 
committee's performance is enhanced by the degree of 
professional expertise possessed by its membership, this is 
neither overriding nor indispensable. Often the most
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valuable qualities brought to any inquiry are objectivity and 
flexibility of approach, none of which bear immediate 
relation to professional credentials. Other general factors 
such as enthusiasm and political orientation can be of 
greater relevance than specialist knowledge of the subject, 
and evidence does not suggest that professional expertise 
improves the quality of participation.
Thirty to fifty perjcent of a committee's membership make up an 
active, dedicated nucleus, only part of which will possess 
relevant professional expertise. Members without
professional qualifications, or one specifically relating to 
a committee's remit, do not appear to be disadvantaged or 
less capable of contributing than their colleagues who have. 
While they may rely more on guidance from committee staff, 
this does not imply an inability to draw personal 
conclusions. In discussion about the merits of hiring 
consultants to assist with select committee inquiries, 
reservations were expressed about the value of their work 
(39). The Irish public representative is not highly paid and 
understandably registers disdain at consultancy fees of three 
hundred pounds per person, per day, for work which they 
themselves have volunteered to do in committee, at no extra 
charge to the exchequer. Aside from financial reservations a 
consultant's business interests are often seen to be in 
conflict with the objectives of committee inquiries, since 
they pertain largely to the very government departments and 
agencies which comprise the most profitable source of income 
for domestic consultancy firms.
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Incentives for Participation
If the subject of an inquiry is controversial members of the 
Oireachtas rarely need inducement to take on select committee 
duties. Problems arise where select committee work occupies 
a lower profile, politically and otherwise. Longstanding 
lobby-group affiliation predisposes most to inquire into or 
discuss certain issues readily. In such cases the incentive 
for participation on committees lies firmly with the hope
that change will be effected in their favour; hence feminists 
will always compete for placement on inquiries into the 
status of women as will farmers where agricultural issues are 
at stake.
Politicians attach themselves to lobby groups and select
committees for broadly similar motives which relate to
electoral and professional/political career orientation; 
members of the Joint Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and
Vandalism (CLVC) for example, drew predominantly from
constituencies where issues relating to crime were seen as 
important. In similiar vein, the CLVC chairman, Deputy 
Michael Woods, Fianna Fail spokesman on Justice during the 
24th Oireachtas, asserted his party's policy when 
crime-related issues were under discussion. The same pattern 
is evident among the membership of other specialist select
committees, i.e. members rarely participate without an
obvious incentive and the participation ratios scored by each 
member betrays the level of committment on all sides. Those
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most involved with an issue under examinination comprise a 
small nucleus which attends a large percentage of meetings 
and usually interrogates witnesses at length. Dedicated 
participation in committee combined with resourceful 
application of information gleaned from hearings, can 
transform a backbencher's style and profile in the 
Oireachtas. In particular, it can provide him with formidable 
ammunition when challenging someone in debate.
Factors other than constituency mandate or direct party 
responsibilities draw politicians to select committee work. 
Motives vary a great deal according to age and status within 
each parliamentary party. Younger or newly elected members, 
who find Dail proceedings slow moving or frustrating, are 
keen to enter the political fast lane. They view select 
committees as progressive fora in which to demonstrate their 
strong|joints, professional or otherwise. In competition for 
places on the high profile committees, they encounter older, 
more established politicians for whom committee life can 
represent many things, such as a preparation for cabinet 
responsibilities, a compensation for lack of same or an 
opportunity to take parliamentary life easier in the years 
approaching retirement (40).
Others, who by their own account object to innovations in the 
use of select committees, take part with the intention of 
blocking unwanted change. Recognising that younger more 
ambitious parliamentarians may gain advantage if left to 
themselves, they endeavour to bring restraint and moderation
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to proceedings. Mostly they are concerned to reassert 
parliament's traditional subservience to the executive (41).
If motives for participation were manifestations of 
constituency, political and professional interests, they 
would still never explain why certain TDs accept multiple and 
diversely different committee assignments at once. Some 
enrol in as many as five different committees - all meeting 
during the same months, some on the same days at the same 
time. Such participation defies categorization. Often the 
only possible motives might lie in impressing the party whip 
by filling a membership quota - for attendance and 
participation ratios were sometimes abysmally low and the 
quality of questions suggest an unimpressive knowledge of, 
and a lack of interest in the subject under review. 
Participation on multiple committees may well be discouraged 
in future, for the adverse affects on committees of a 
disparate uncommitted membership with divided loyalties are 
widely recognised. Moreover, it may be seen that
backbenchers can serve their own promotion prospects better 
by acting on one committee only; constructive attention given 
to a single issue may, in the long term, serve to enhance 
their credibility.
Many members, even those with single committee assignments, 
attend meetings infrequently and display a consistent lack of 
interest in the subject under investigation. The factors 
which separate the dedicated from the unenthusiastic often 
depend on the expectations each member holds for committee
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work in general. Many, particularly those without 
ministerial experience, cultivate unrealistically high 
expectations and anticipate instant reforms from reports and 
recommendations. Those with medium to low expectations tend 
to have ministerial experience or enough years of public 
representation behind them to know that committee
recommendations are not a priority at senior departmental or 
cabinet level. Undoubtedly an inverse relation exists 
between those who hold high expectations for committees and 
lack ministerial experience and vice versa. Younger, 
newly-elected representatives are sometimes unaware of, or 
choose to ignore the limitations implicit in executive 
office.
Five years after the launch of the new committees it would 
seem that many overambitious hopes were invested into what 
they could achieve. Of all the select committees set up 
since 1978 only four are still in existence. Those who saw 
the committees as tools of instant parliamentary reform seem 
now to be somewhat dissillusioned. Yet a thorough account of 
select committee activity in the Oireachtas has still to be 
undertaken, and the absence of such an account prevents us 
from making a useful assessment of committee achievements. 
The following two chapters, which describe the activities of 
the Dail Committee on Public Expenditure and the Joint 
Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies in some detail, while not 
providing an exhaustive compendium on their work, may go some 
way towards describing their modus operandi, and possibly,
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evaluating their worth. A brief account of other select 
committees appointed during the 24th Oireachtas is set out in 
chapter four.
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The Pail Committee on Public Expenditure
The debate surrounding public expenditure has been of 
increasing relevance to Irish politicians, especially during 
the nineteen-eighties. Discrepancies between income and 
expenditure which caused an unprecedented growth in 
borrowing lie at the root of Ireland's current economic 
dilemma. Stringent corrective measures, previously 
criticised as doom and gloom economics, are now acceptable 
criteria for government policy formulation. Meanwhile, on 
his own doorstep, the backbench TD is called to account for 
the economic crisis. Why, it is asked, have recent 
recessions left us more devastated than any other European 
nation, and exactly who do the leadership refer to when they 
suggest that people are living beyond their means? Under 
such interrogation no appropriate line of defence can be 
offered. In truth, the policy decisions which led to a 
situation approaching national bankruptcy were the 
miscalculations of a few, albeit in collective party guises. 
In theory at least, such policy was, and is, formulated in 
the name of the mainstream government party and with the 
support of the Dail. In practice those occupying the back 
benches have little input into monetary or fiscal policy.
The inadequacy of existing mechanisms by which parliament 
monitors or influences state expenditure led deputy Mervyn 
Taylor to comment that:
CHAPTER TWO
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This House has virtually no control over 
public finances ... The key matters are 
determined by the executive and backbenchers 
on either side of the House have very little 
input into the control or analysis of public 
finances. Debates take place on the 
Estimates and voluminous figures are 
produced, but debates are phrased in general 
terms and it is not possible for a Deputy to 
find out in detail how the money voted by 
this House is being expended (1).
Quite apart from the secretive and confusing process by 
which annual Estimates are determined, backbenchers are 
denied access to financial decision-making by extraneous 
factors such as the lack of appropriate investigative 
resources, the absence of a forum in which to discuss state 
finances and time-consuming constituency work. Typically, 
TD s seeking to alter specific appropriations are concerned 
with increasing rather than cutting back expenditure and 
such factors have probably deterred successive governments 
from increasing parliament's influence over financial 
matters.
Faced with an ever increasing balance of payments deficit, 
rising unemployment and the harshest fiscal policies in the 
European Community, a core group of prominent politicians, 
such as deputies John Bruton, Alan Dukes, Mervyn Taylor, and 
Michael Keating, to name but a few, argued for reform of 
parliament's control over expenditure. It was felt that:
Unless steps are taken to bring the
executive branch of Government under some
kind of answerability to this House ....
[it] will devolve even more than it is now
into little more than a grand debating
society where backbenchers serve their
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constituencies but have little input into the 
real control of finances (2).
The Coalition Government discussion document A Better Wav to 
Plan the Nation's Finances. published in 1982, set out a 
blueprint for improving existing parliamentary controls over 
expenditure. Three options were envisaged as part of the 
overall programme for reform of financial procedures. First, 
an institutional approach to expenditure evaluation was 
sought. This related to systematic analysis and evaluation 
of departmental programmes. A new Committee on Public 
Expenditure (PEC), was intended to consider not only 
financial efficiencies but also social and economic 
considerations. An expanded role for the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C&AG), who would co-operate with both the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC), and the new PEC was 
forecast. Unlike the PAC, which is mainly concerned with 
regularity and propriety of expenditure 'in other words its 
concern is principally with whether spending was properly 
authorised, not with whether it was wise', the PEC would 
concentrate on the justification for and effectiveness of 
ongoing expenditure programmes (3).
Remit
The structure for the PEC was planned along a similiar 
framework to the Joint Committee on Commercial State 
Sponsored Bodies, (SSBC). Originally, John Bruton initiated
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the proposal at senior level within FG. As leader of the 
House with special responsibility for Dail reform, he 
instigated a series of new committees. On 21 June 1983, as 
Minister for Industry and Commerce, he proposed that 'a 
Select Committee, (which shall be called the Committee on 
Public Expenditure), consisting of seventeen members, be 
appointed to review the justification for and effectiveness 
of, ongoing expenditure of Government departments and 
offices, and of non-commercial State-Sponsored Bodies, in 
such areas as it may select'. He moved that it would also 
'report thereon to the House, recommending cost-effective 
alternatives and/or the elimination of wasteful or obsolete 
programmes, where desirable' (4). The PEC's comprehensive 
terms of reference, reproduced in Appendix A . included the 
right to:
-- appoint sub-committees
-- meet in public, unless they decide otherwise 
-- send for persons, papers and records, subject to the 
consent of the Minister for the Public Service 
-- engage the services of experts/specialists 
-- print and publish reports and such documents as it thinks 
fit
-- present an annual progress report to Dail Eireann 
-- have its reports debated in the Dail within 12 sitting 
days of presentation.
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The PEC remit is best described as multi-purpose. On the 
one hand it was empowered to monitor those non-commercial 
state sponsored bodies excluded from the schedule for 
investigation by the SSBC, while on the other, it was 
prescribed the gargantuan task of reviewing the 
'justification for and the effectiveness of, ongoing 
expenditure of Government Departments' (5). Put in context, 
the new committee was expected to review the spending of 
more than six billion pounds.
Each new select committee received terms of reference which 
were framed by the executive. The PEC was no exception. Due 
perhaps to Bruton's personal interest in its structures and 
remit, his experience as Minister for Finance and to his 
personal standing within FG, the PEC received greater 
privileges than other new select committees. Separate 
additional factors may have determined the special status 
and powers conferred upon the PEC. It originated against a 
backround of uncertainty and controversy regarding the 
cost-effectiveness of government expenditure. To the more 
optimistic politician it heralded a radical departure from 
executive dominance over financial matters. Others 
responded more sceptically, not least of whom was the 
prospective PEC chairman, deputy Michael Keating. Once a 
Minister of State at the Department of Education, his 
failure to be appointed to the 1982 coalition cabinet was 
greeted with general surprise. His later appointment as 
chairman of the PEC was interpreted by some as compensatory
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or consolatory. Keating, despite the earlier disappointment, 
welcomed his new role, insistent however, that the PEC would 
not provide window dressing for the coalition, nor would it 
accept the fate of obscurity which had shrouded the work of 
the SSBC since its establishment in 1976. (Of all the 
reports produced by that committee, none had ever been 
debated in the Dail). He remarked:
If these committees are set up they should be 
meaningful, accountable, publicly accessible 
and should be doing their work openly and 
subject to scrutiny. They should not be a 
forum into which a recalcitrant Minister can 
kick an issue simply to evade responsibility
or accountability in this House (6).
Opinions such as this may have influenced the scope of 
powers delegated to the PEC in its terms of reference. The 
final document enshrined liberal powers which were not 
enjoyed by other committees. Similarly the receipt of staff 
and accomodation resources were also unrivalled. The first 
of many significant differences between the PEC and its 
sister committees, the PAC and the SSBC, was the number and 
source of members appointed. The seventeen PEC members, 
exclusively drawn from the Dail, were empowered to appoint 
sub-committees. This helped create more efficient working 
habits which broadened the scope of inquiries and increased 
output. An additional provision, included as an appendix to 
the terms of reference, allowed that 'three hours be set 
aside for a debate on a motion, that Dail Eireann takes note 
of the report, to be taken not later than the twelfth day on
which the Dail shall sit after the day on which the report
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shall have been laid before the Dail' (7). This particular 
privilege guaranteed the PEC a degree of parliamentary 
exposure beyond the scope of other select committees.
A clause providing for the annual submission of progress 
reports gave incentive to produce and report on actual 
results. Each year, a progress report summarised the PEC's 
main recommendations and discussed the official feedback to 
its proposals. This process became known as a 'follow-up 
action' strategy, and the committee regarded it as the only 
tool it had to sustain the pressure for action (8). In 
practice this strategy involved contacting those departments 
and agencies which had received recommendations from the PEC 
six months after a report had been issued, to request an 
account of their progress in the areas on which proposals 
had been made. Thereafter, a department's or agency's 
formal reply to those proposals was published in the annual 
report.
Despite concessions made to the PEC, it still could not 
compel reluctant witnesses to give oral evidence. Thus, 
ministers were under no obligation to appear before the 
committee and civil service officials who chose not to 
attend were acting within their rights. Empowering a 
committee to sub-poena witnesses is a complicated issue 
which is bound up with the question of immunity or 
privilege. The delegation of such powers would first 
require appropriate legislation to be passed in the 
Oireachtas.
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If the PEC received greater privileges than other committees 
it also faced sterner obstructions to its work. It was one 
thing for the SSBC to investigate commercial state 
enterprises, and quite another for the PEC to attempt to 
make accountable the centre of government and power. At all 
levels the SSBC traversed a smoother path and generally 
ruffled fewer administrative feathers. The PEC on the other 
hand probed and questioned at every level of the civil and 
non commercial public service, and generally became a source 
of irritation to many departments and agencies -- a factor 
which possibly influenced Fianna Fail (FF) in their decision 
not to reinstate it for the 25th Oireachtas.
Section 6 of the terms of reference contained a clause 
ordering the committee to protect the confidentiality of 
departments and agencies investigated (9). This clause did 
have an inhibiting influence on PEC work. Mostly it caused 
meetings to be conducted in private which would otherwise 
have been public, and it created difficulties when access to 
corporate plans or relevant official documentation was 
sought. Interview evidence suggests that the need for 
confidentiality was exaggerated, especially since the PEC 
was prepared to accept amended or censored documentation
(10). The Forestry and Wildlife Services Agency, who were 
acting on the advice of the Attorney General, refused to 
reveal the terms of their tender agreements for the sale of 
pulpwood, on the grounds that such contracts 'specifically 
debarred disclosure of confidential information to third
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parties' (11). The PEC looking elsewhere found the same
information freely and without legal difficulty. A later
PEC report questioned
whether it is reasonable and appropriate 
for a Government Department or agency to 
undertake a commercial contract on a basis 
which excludes the right of the Dail and 
in particular the Dail Committee on Public 
Expenditure to examine it. Whether in the 
particular case the Dail can be considered 
a third party in a contract between a 
Government Department and a private firm 
(12).
The PEC considered it 'to be inappropriate gamesmanship to 
be drawn into an argument about whether it had the right to 
a document which it has in fact been able to procure 
independently of its appropriate and direct line of access' 
(13).
The scope of PEC work was conditioned by factors other than 
the terms of reference. A set of largely 'restrictive' 
guidelines had been devised by the Department of the Public 
Service for all officials giving evidence (14). Of those PEC 
members interviewed during the course of this research, all 
agreed that these guidelines should be modified to allow 
greater flexibility. One commentator remarked that full 
adherence to them would leave a witness free only to state 
his name, and that in itself might be deemed incriminating. 
'There is no doubt that a very literal interpretation of 
these guidelines could scuttle the work of the Committee' 
(15).
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Membership
With a membership of seventeen, the PEC was the second 
largest committee of the 24th Oireachtas. But while the 
largest, the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of 
the EEC, had twenty-eight members, as a joint committee it 
drew membership from both the Dail and the Seanad. The 
seventeen PEC members were; on the other hand, drawn 
exclusively from the Dail in li .a wil'H the proportional 
representation of the parliamentary parties. Fine Gael and 
Labour, the coalition partners, appointed eight and two 
members respectively. One FG deputy, John Kelly, apart from 
his experience as Attorney General had also acted as 
Minister for Industry and Commerce, whilst one other, 
Michael Keating, had served as a junior minister at the 
Department of Education for a short period. Two of the 
eight FF deputies appointed, Michael Kennedy and John 
Wilson, had also served in government. No Independent or 
Workers Party deputies were members of the PEC, nor were any 
female TDs. The absence of female representation was raised 
informally at a PEC meeting on 13 March, 1984, and it was 
suggested during interview that female deputies had not 
asked to participate on the PEC through lack of interest, 
evidenced by the fact that none had ever contributed to 
debates on PEC reports in the Dail (16).
Members were recruited in different ways and for various 
reasons, Unlike some of the new committees, those assigned
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to the PEC invariably requested the appointment. Thus we 
can conclude that the majority of the membership were there 
by choice. However, it is impossible to ascertain clearcut 
motives for participation. Naturally the PEC attracted 
those deputies most interested in assessing expenditure 
efficiencies and control.
Work Procedures
Over sixty agencies and government departments fell within 
the PEC's brief. Such a great number necessitated 
rationalised and systematic working habits. Those adopted 
in the early stages represented a compromise between various 
styles and ideas held within the committee. Substantial 
differences in approach existed between the younger, less 
experienced, PEC delegates and their older more 
conservative colleagues. A two-tiered plan of action was 
devised in an effort to reconcile these. Richard Bruton 
described this compromise as 'a balance between major Agency 
reviews and once-off studies of waste' (17).
The first approach was characterised by the use of a single 
overall strategy of investigation. Together with 
consultants Craig Gardner and Associates and the clerk to 
the PEC, a comprehensive list of questions on current and 
capital expenditure programmes was drawn up and despatched 
to all government departments and non - commercial
state-sponsored bodies. Extracts from this questionnaire 
are outlined in the first annual progress report. Focussing
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loosely on the financial data published in the annual list 
of Comprehensive Public Expenditure Programmes, it enshrined 
twenty-three specific but in-depth questions of which the 
first two read:
1.1 Identify the Public Expenditure Programmes for which 
your Department is responsible in whole or in part. The 
’Tentative Programme Listing1 contained in the book entitled 
'Comprehensive Public Expenditure Programmes' should be used 
as a basis in answering this question.
2.1 Provide a copy of the statement of overall aims, 
policies and objectives for each programme identified at 1.1 
above. Alternatively if the aims, policies and objectives 
are clearly understood, although unwritten, please state 
them (18).
The investment of civil service work-hours in replying to 
these questionnaires is not easily estimated. Judging by 
general comments made by officials when giving evidence to 
the committee, it involved far more than they wanted to 
give. The PEC used this approach in an effort to 
rationalise its work procedures and thereby highlight the 
weaknesses common to all government departments and 
agencies. It also sought to establish an immediate overview 
of all public expenditure programmes, or 'to flush out 
objectives, performance, systems of control and areas of 
weakness' (19). Replies were used as 'the starting point of 
the investigation', which was seen as the 'first peep the
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public has had in years into some of the darker corners of 
Government activity' (20).
The PEC used a second work method which, looking at 
'once-off studies', was more ad hoc and less systematic. It 
depended, unreliably, on the particular interests of the 
membership, and to an extent on the publicity potential of 
the subject matter. The annual progress report described 
such ad hoc inquiries as a 'consideration of specific 
expenditure items or policies which would be suggested for 
review'. It provided that 'such items could be brought up 
for inclusion on the agenda at short notice, if considered 
sufficiently urgent by Members' (21). Such 'items' usually 
came to the attention of individual deputies on the 
committee as complaints from constituents or through media 
reports highlighting incidents of expenditure waste. A 
review was undertaken if the PEC felt the situation 
warranted one. The reports on the Faults in Buildings 
Occupied by the Public Service and the Review of Procedures 
Relating to Road Openings by Utilities are but two examples 
of once-off studies which arose incidentally. In the case of 
the former report, the PEC inquired into faults in Kildare 
House, a Department of the Public Service building, because 
a member of the PEC happened to observe repair work on a 
building which he knew to have been purchased only recently.
Appendix B which lists the title of each PEC report 
indicates the diverse range of the committee's work. Despite 
this versatility, however, the central thrust of the
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inquiries remained consistent, i.e. to encourage the optimum 
utilisation of state funds. The criteria used to set the 
agenda for inquiry varied greatly according to the work 
methods outlined above. Those criteria can be summarised as 
follows :
(i) perceived discrepancies or incomplete information in the 
questionnaires returned to the committee, (i.e. those 
questionnaires which the PEC submitted to all the 
departments and agencies under their remit),
(ii) submissions received from members of the public or from 
representatives of private institutions which highlighted 
occasions of malpractice or expenditure waste, (such 
submissions are usually sent in reply to advertisements 
posted by the PEC prior to each inquiry),
(iii) specific incidences of extravagance or general mishaps 
which directly caught the attention of members of the 
committee, (i.e. through news items, constituency work or 
personal encounters).
Numerous inquiries were sparked off by submissions, news 
reports, or specific incidents which caught the interest or 
imagination of the membership. John Bruton, and certain 
members of the PEC, had not envisaged this style or approach 
to its work and found it to be unsatisfactory (22). Those 
who did favour this unsystematic and rather sensationalist 
approach, foresaw a particularist role for the PEC, which
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only impromptu, ad hoc inquiries could fulfil. This outlook 
betrayed the modest and conservative expectations which some 
held for the new committee. It conveyed an inherent 
scepticism towards select committees and what they could 
achieve in general, which possibly stemmed from long years 
of experience in a hostile parliamentary setting. To a 
degree, those who held pessimistic expectations for select 
committee prospects doubted the competence of the all-party 
membership either to grapple with the technical and
complicated issues of government and policy, or to make 
recommendations based on sound judgement. The assumption 
that a select group of backbenchers with limited access to
professional expertise, working under considerable party
political and constituency pressure, could cope with
ambitious investigations into big-spending government 
departments, was unacceptable to them. Instead of an 
ambitious investigative function they envisaged a modest
role for the PEC in highlighting incidences of expenditure 
waste and departmental mishaps. They envisaged a media 
profile for the committee which would publicise expenditure 
inefficiencies and prompt curative action. If such publicity 
could in the meantime enhance the electoral profile of 
committee members, then this would be more than an added 
bonus for their efforts.
This interpretation of the PEC's role was advocted by deputy 
John Kelly at the committee's very first meeting. In his 
view the PEC should have readjusted its objectives, for, as 
he pointed out then, 'to take it on ourselves to be a
60
further control over £6,000 million worth of expenditure, 
reassessing departmental estimates, reassessing the need for 
this and that, is something quite beyond us. It would be 
beyond any of us individually without an entire public 
service behind us and will be beyond this Committee' (23). 
Deputy Kelly's view was a minority one, insofar as most of 
those acting on the PEC had considerable hopes for what it 
was capable of achieving. Nonetheless, a compromise was 
arrived at which accommodated the different approaches into 
the overall committee strategy. Hence the decision to
follow up media-worthy leads, or modest investigations, as 
well as the immediate ambitious investigations for which the 
committee was set up.
While the publicity advantages of impromptu inquiries may 
have influenced the PEC's decision to incorporate both
strategies, (i.e. the controversial with the more thorough 
systematic reviews), the negative implications of the former 
cannot have been foreseen until it was too late. Inquiries 
which deviated from a structured agenda to examine ad hoc, 
incidental issues, (such as the design faults in Kildare 
House), impaired the committee's long-_term strategy as a 
parliamentary watchdog overseeing departmental expenditure. 
Ad hoc inquiries could not but result in sketchy work 
procedures which did nothing to engender any great 
confidence within the public service or the cabinet. All
committees depend upon the goodwill of those who would most 
bear the brunt of their work, i.e. the executive. Such 
goodwill is conditional upon the mature and reasonable
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behaviour of each committee. Media headlines attracted by- 
certain PEC hearings, like that on the repeated excavation 
of Merrion Street, Dublin, (74 times over three years), gave 
the committee an image which did not match the executive's 
view of mature and coherent behaviour (24).
In general, PEC work procedures were very ill-defined during 
the early years, which may have been understandable given 
the unprecedented and experimental nature of its activities. 
Unfortunately, a reputation for badly organised and 
sensationalist work remained with the PEC throughout its 
short existence, possibly because it was seen to have 
tackled too much, too quickly and unsystematically. At one 
stage several investigations were in progress 
simultaneously, and consultants were hired overzealously. 
Privately, civil servants wondered why they should be held 
answerable to a body which they perceived as disorganised 
and unable to conduct its own business efficiently (25).
Nonetheless, the PEC did make significant efforts to improve 
and constantly update its work methods. Guidance was sought 
from the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) and the 
chairman occasionally met with his opposite on the PAC to 
ensure that there was no overlap in their work. The PEC 
also liaised informally with the SSBC to maintain a 'regular 
exchange of views' (26). It also met with other European 
'budgetary commissions' or parliamentary committees on 
public expenditure to 'discuss, inter alia, methods used to 
control and evaluate public expenditure' (27). It was hoped
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that contact with experienced expenditure committees would 
give insights Into the pitfalls of certain procedures and 
the benefits of others. These meetings were held in a 
variety of locations over a two year period: in Rome in
1984, and in Venice and Paris in 1985.
In January 1985, a PEC delegation visited London to review 
the British select committee system. They attended a public 
session of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee whilst 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave evidence. Later they 
met with British parliamentary committees dealing with 
public expenditure, Public Accounts and with the Prime 
Minister's Efficiency Unit. In September 1986 another 
delegation visited the United States on a similiar 
fact-finding mission. On the basis of such trips abroad, a 
report on International Comparisons of Parliamentary 
Accountability for Public Expenditure was compiled in 
January, 1987. This report included recommendations 
designed to improve PEC procedures in the light of the 
experience gained abroad.
A considerable, possibly, excessive, number of consultants 
was engaged under section 3 of the terms of reference during 
the early stages of PEC work. Members were experimenting 
with work procedures in an effort to devise an optimal 
strategy. This involved enthusiastic and somewhat 
over-ambitious efforts to inquire into as much as possible 
in a short period of time. Having engaged a full-time 
advisor with experience in accounting and finance,
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work-practices soon settled into a coherent pattern and 
outside consultants were commissioned only when it was 
deemed essential.
On recommendation from the chairman, academics and 
specialists from universities and the private sector were 
invited to form a voluntary advisory commission which would 
assist and complement PEC work. Known as the Business 
Advisory Panel it gave the PEC access to collective opinions 
and advice from those who had valuable practical experience. 
Deputy Keating's suggestion for the advisory panel was 
inspired by his admiration for a similiar concept known as 
the Grace Commission, which was an advisory board much 
consulted by politicians in the United States.
In October 1986, the PEC issued a summarised report just in
time for the budgetary preparation process. This report
outlined a list of what were described as Immediately
Implementable Public Sector Savings and Management
Improvements. It contained recommendations which inclined
more towards an improvements strategy than actually
identifying areas in which expenditure should be decreased.
Proposals concentrated on the areas which in the PEC's view
lwere in need of increased accountability and managability,
A
and suggested necessary changes in procedure or structure.
The PEC received a wide variety of submissions, all of which 
it attempted to treat fairly and without discrimination. 
This augured badly for coherence and systematic control,
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because committees can sometimes attract cranks and interest 
groups, even from the business world, who seek to promote 
their interests. It is the responsibility of a committee to 
differentiate the wood from the trees when dealing with 
written submissions and deciding who to call for oral 
evidence. In the case of the PEC, the choice for inviting 
witnesses was undiscerning on occasion, and embarrassing 
situations, which otherwise could have been avoided, served 
to undermine the flegling committee even more.
Specific hearings stand out as particularly inopportune, 
such as those concerning the use of a charge-card system for 
civil servants and the cost of their travel and subsistence. 
Both hearings, which were the result of an informal exchange 
between the PEC chairman and executives of both Diners Club 
and Lep Travel, read as little more than a trade/sales 
promotion by the companies involved (28). Committee members 
themselves registered alarm at the nature of the oral 
submissions. Hugh Coveney interrupted one witness to point 
out that the PEC was 'creating a dangerous precedent. We 
want to hear about the principle rather than the facts about 
this particular company [Diners Club]. If this chamber is 
to be used by individual companies to sell themselves that 
will be a dangerous precedent' (29). Even if such evidence 
was essential to an investigation, the hearings might best 
have been considered in private.
The committee visited Switzerland in October, 1986, by 
invitation of the Swiss Parliament. Their objective in
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travelling was to review and experience the work of the 
Swiss committee empowered to review public expenditure. The 
preparations for the visit fell into difficulty at the last 
minute. Interview evidence, although unclear, suggests that 
these difficulties involved either a lack of official 
budgetary approval, or insufficient administrative
preparation. The repercussions of such disorganisation 
might have been less serious under other circumstances. In 
this instance however, the failure of the delegation to 
arrive in Switzerland might have given rise to diplomatic 
problems, given that no official Irish delegation had 
visited Switzerland for nearly thirty years. The visit 
eventually went ahead when members of the PEC delegation 
undertook to finance themselves until such time as they 
were reimbursed by the Department of the Public Service.
The difficulties encountered by the committee in this 
instance may have resulted from a basic administrative 
misunderstanding. They may also have been caused 
deliberately by those who wished to discredit the PEC or its 
chairman, who shortly afterwards left Fine Gael to join the 
new Progressive Democrat*Party.
Any evaluation of the work habits of the PEC must 
acknowledge the trojan efforts of certain individuals to 
make it successful. A determined pace was established from 
the outset. Every Tuesday afternoon was reserved for 
committee business, except during August and two weeks over 
the Christmas period. Members were under no obligation to
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meet so frequently, other than their own concern to make 
their new committee effective. It is an indication of their 
committment that they sustained a steady attendance level 
throughout the 24th Oireachtas, particularly since the 
committee at no stage enjoyed its full quota of members due 
to the cumbersome process of reappointment. (The PEC lost 
three members when deputy George Colley (FF) died shortly 
after the committee was set up in 1983, deputy John Ryan 
(Lab.) became Leas Ceann-Comhairle and deputy Seamus 
Pattison (Lab.) was appointed Minister of State at the 
Department of Social Welfare).
PEC Attendance and Participation
Table 1 outlines attendance and participation indicators for 
individual PEC members over a sample series of meetings held 
in 1983, 1984 and 1985. The attendance figures included in 
column A are out of a possible twenty-six meetings where the 
average was 14, while the participation figures in column B 
are out of a total of 2311 questions and a possible average 
of 136. These figures are drawn from those minutes of 
evidence published before 1987 and include figures for 
public hearings only while the minutes of private hearings 
remain undisclosed. These figures are intended solely as 
indicators of membership performance and not as definitive 
records of attendance and participation. Appendix A includes 
a list of PEC members since 1983.
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TABLE 1.
PAIL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
A B
Meetings
Attended
No. Of 
Questions
Keating 
O'Kennedy
Allen
Brennan
Bruton
Byrne
Colley/
Fitzgerald
Coveney
Doyle
Farrelly
Hilliard
Hyland
Kelly
Pattison/
Bell
Ryan
Treacy/
O' Sullivan 
Wilson
23
12
17 
19 
25
9
2
15
18
14 
10 
12
15 
0 
5
13
19
0
16
844
227
81
21
346
67
2
88
138
77
59
5
123
30
36
59
108
Total number of meetings: 26
Total number of questions: 2311
Average number of questions: 136
Average attendance: 14.35
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Table 2 . PEC Output
1 1 
| Report |
Number 
of Pages
Number of | 
| Recommendations |
1 1 1 1 1 10 1 9 1 ■ «1 !
! 2 | i I 72
1 | 
1 15 |I i1 1 
1 3 |1 I 23
1
1 I1 1 
1 4- 11 I 96
1
1 16 |1 I1 1
1 5 1 1 i 7
1 1
1 4 1 I t1 1 
1 6 | 1 I 91
1 I 
1 34 |1 I1 1 
1 7 |1 i 9
1
1 1 11 11 1
1 & ! I i 249
1 1 
1 11 1
1 ! 
1 9 11 I 24
1 I
1 1 1 I |
101 I 52
1 | 
1 6I »1 1
1 11 1 1 I 10
1 I
1 4 1 I I1
1 12 | 1 I 70
1 I
l i1
1 13 |1 I 79
1 I 
1 14 1 11 1 
1 14 1l i 106
1 I
1 10 | I I1
1 15 |1 I 74
1 |
1 4 1 I I1 1 
1 16 | 1 I 41
1 I 
1 11 1 1 11 1 
1 17 |1 i 91
1 | 
1 16 |I t
181 1 21
1 |
| 6 1 1 «1
1 19 |f t 20
I
1 II
i 20 |
1 1'
31
1 | 
1 15 | 1 11 1 
1 21 | I I 45
1 1
1 16 |I |1 1 
1 22 | 1 1 117
1 1
1 16 | I I1 1 
1 23 | 90
1
1 !5 |n i
1 24 |1 1 45
1 1
1 7 || I1 I 
1 25 |1 i 42
1 1 
1 15 |1 I1 1 
1 26 |
1 1
16
) !
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Reports 3, 12 and 26 are annual progress reports which
summarise recommendations already included in other reports. 
Report 19 also includes recommendations which are considered 
elsewhere. Titles and publication dates of each report are 
outlined in Appendix B.
Reports and Recommendations
Next to the Secondary Legislation Committee of the EEC, the 
PEC produced the highest number of reports. The former 
observed different work habits, however, and with a large 
membership of twenty-eight it strove to keep apace of EEC 
legislation. The PEC on the other hand determined its own 
schedule and pace independently and produced twenty-six 
complete reports. The breakdown in output contained in 
Table 2 above lists the number of pages and recommendations 
contained in each one.
Each PEC report contained an average of eleven 
recommendations. A total of 246 of these were issued over a 
range of 23 subjects. Report 6, a Review of the Department 
of the Public Service, contained the highest number at 34, 
whilst reports 7 and 9, on the Service of the Public Debt 
and the Review of the Proposal to Introduce a Charge Card 
System for Civil Servants Travelling on Public Business, 
both contained only a single recommendation. The lengthiest 
report, number 8 on the Control of Capital Projects, dealt 
with a wide variety of departmental expenditure programmes. 
The shortest was on the Service of the Public Debt, number 
7. These figures account for the appendices included in PEC 
reports.
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By attempting to confine itself to very narrow issues and 
contain the number and scope of recommendations, the PEC 
endeavoured to stay within the bounds of what was feasibly 
implementable. Certain other committees, like that on Small 
Businesses, tended to produce voluminous recommendations, 
many of which were considered impractical.
In-depth evaluation of all 26 reports is not possible. A 
sample two, reports 2 and 15, have been selected for 
analysis according to particular criteria, the most 
important of which is availability of data. As was the case 
for all Oireachtas committees, great inconsistencies existed 
in the release of PEC publications. Whilst reports were 
freely available, the minutes of evidence were published in 
irregular and unsystematic fashion. Officially, the missing 
editions were either awaiting publication, or were released 
in limited quantities which went out of stock immediately. 
The PEC relied on Leinster House editorial services which, 
working without an appropriate increase in staff numbers, 
found it hard to adapt to the needs of all the new 
committees. Consequently several PEC 'Minutes of Evidence' 
are unavailable. Analysis here focusses on reports for 
which official government feedback was generated, for it is 
probable that the effectiveness of PEC work might better be 
gauged where overt executive replies to their 
recommendations exist.
Report 2
The Proposal to Establish a Centralised State Agency
for Persons Registering for Training or Employment
This investigation was initiated by the PEC at a very early 
stage. References to the need for a critical examination of 
these state services were in fact made in its first report. 
Multiple expert reports informed the PEC decision to pursue 
the issue further. An OECD examination, conducted in 1982 
and published in the report Improving Youth Employment 
Opportunities. criticised aspects of the services provided 
by state agencies in the area of employment and training for 
young people (30). The NESC report on Manpower Policy also 
set out extensive recommendations for reform in this area, 
as did the ESRI in their document Employment and 
Unemployment Policy for Ireland which was published early in 
1984. An evaluation of the National Manpower Services was 
called for, citing 'an urgent need for central co-ordination 
of all agencies operating in the sphere because, currently, 
responsibility is fragmented, accountability is difficult to 
enforce, inter-agency friction occurs and agencies are left 
to form policy which is properly the prerogative of 
Government Ministers and their departments' (31).
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An earlier PEC report into Civil Service Commission 
Recruitment revealed inconsistencies which corroborated the 
findings of the specialist reports mentioned above. This was 
further confirmed by the submissions received by the PEC 
which indicated much 'overlap in functions and policies and 
a certain lack of clarity of role definition' (32). The 
system was seen as one 'presenting a confusing array of 
schemes, offices and procedures which must be an inhibiting 
factor in achieving the objectives for which the schemes 
were originally intended' (33). The committee 'having 
completed hearing evidence from the Departments/Agencies 
involved in programmes for recruitment, employment and 
training, confirmed its initial opinion that, in this 
important area, there is fragmentation, duplication and a 
lack of co-ordination of services that is wasteful of public 
expenditure and unacceptable at a time when there are 
unprecedented demands on Exchequer resources' (34).
In this its second report, the PEC describes the 
relationship between all the relevant agencies in detail. 
Identifying areas of overlap, it presents recommendations 
'on action which needs to be taken to rationalise existing 
services' (35). It proposes the amalgamation of all 
agencies related to unemployment and training. Soon after 
the launch of the report, the concept of a centralised state 
agency for such services was drafted into a Department of 
Labour policy document and the official amalgamation of 
AnCo, Manpower, and the YEA took place on January 1, 1988.
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The new agency is known as An Foras Aiseanna Saothair, 
(FAS).
The extent to which this policy was determined by PEC 
recommendations, if at all, is difficult to ascertain. 
Little direct causal evidence, other than a general 
reference to the PEC in the policy document, links the two, 
and the committee cannot claim to have originated an idea 
which had been discussed long before it was ever 
established. Aside from the actual proposal however, the 
PEC issued several recommendations relating to how such a 
policy should be implemented. The official reaction to these 
recommendations was monitored through the committee's 
'follow-up' strategy. Each government department and agency 
affected by the proposal was contacted six months after the 
publication of the report and a full reply to all 
recommendations was requested. These official replies, which 
were published in the Second Annual Progress Report were not 
unfavourable. Of the fifteen recommendations made by the 
committee in all, several pertained to more than one 
department and agency.
In general each respondent referred to the forthcoming White 
Paper. Of the two recommendations specific to the Department 
of the Public Service, both were adopted, although one had 
already been implemented prior to the publication of the 
report. A further two recommendations relating to the 
Department of Social Welfare were adopted and said to be in 
the planning stage (36). The Department of Education and
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the Youth Employment Agency appeared to favour a review of 
their respective 1 and 6 recommendations, before committing 
themselves to a more definite reply. Only AnCo rejected the 
bulk of the proposals which related to its operations and 
though the Department of Labour broadly accepted the twelve 
recommendations concerning its procedures, it availed of the 
opportunity to chastise the PEC on its allegations of 
expenditure waste caused by duplication in services. Having 
requested the relevant documentation from the PEC the 
department noted 1 that the evidence available to the 
committee suggesting waste of public funds has not been 
supplied despite the Minister of State's invitation to the 
Committee to furnish such evidence in his speeches in the
Dail ..'. The i D ox /1 t “co w . I vi v _ c i . that 'in
I
the absence of relevant details the Committee will, no 
doubt, appreciate the Department's difficulty in trying to 
investigate or respond to generalised uncorroborated 
assertions of this nature' (37). In fact, the committee had 
simply presumed that duplication led to expenditure waste 
and countered that it 'had no evidence that the duplication 
of services was more cost-effective, as seems to be implied 
by the official response' (38).
Despite welcoming the exective's co-operation in replying to 
their requests, the PEC considered the continued references 
to the forthcoming White Paper to be 'regrettable if [they 
were] used as an excuse for inaction on problems that have 
continued to exist since the Committee's review was 
completed in early 1984' (39).
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With escalating unemployment figures and the absence of a 
White Paper on manpower policy for over twenty years, the 
coalition government were aware of the need for reform in 
this area. The shortfall was formally recognised in the 
Programme for Action in Education 1984-87. George 
Bermingham, T.D. was appointed Minister of State at the 
Department of Education and the Department of Labour with 
special responsibility to review the possibilities of 
co-ordinating services and eliminating duplication in 
training.
A White Paper on Manpower Policy was later published in 
September, 1986, with the stated purpose of improving the 
effectiveness of the labour force, promoting equity in the 
labour market, and defining the proposed organisational 
arrangements in order to achieve objectives at the minimum 
cost. It included many provisions which followed on from 
the recommendations made by the PEC. Recognition of their 
input was formally acknowledged as follows:
The recommendations in the recent NESC Report on 
Manpower Policy and the findings of the Dail 
Committee on Public Expenditure and other 
relevant reviews and recommendations have been 
taken into account in the preparation of this 
paper (40).
The PEC report, and recommendations contained therein, must 
be seen to have contributed to the party political consensus 
from which government policy emerged. Possibly through
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appropriate timing or sheer weight of influence, the report 
may have affected policy in a way which other reports, i.e. 
OECD, NESC and ESRI, did not. The PEC hearings provided 
deputies with a valuable forum for evaluating an issue with 
policy potential, which might otherwise have been 
unavailable to them. Even if the amalgamation of these 
particular agencies was inevitable, with or without PEC 
recommendations, backbench TDs had an opportunity to 
evaluate this legislative intiative before they were called 
upon to vote. As a result of the PEC inquiry, those members 
of the Oireachtas who supported the motion to centralise the 
state agencies for persons registering for employment and 
training could do so with full knowledge of the facts.
Report 15
Institute for Industrial Research and Standards
Like most PEC investigations this concentrated on a review 
of Institute for Industrial Research and Standards (IIRS) 
costs rather than its general activities. While the report 
is prefaced with an acknowledgement that the committee's 
primary concerns have 'happily been resolved or are in the 
course of resolution', the PEC experienced significant 
difficulties during the course of their review into this 
agency, mostly because it proved initially to be a somewhat 
unwilling subject (41). As the investigation progressed, 
personality differences between those conducting the 
investigation and those bearing the brunt of it evidently
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influenced the proceedings. This may have been related to 
the factors which gave rise to the inquiry in the first 
place. The IIRS were the last to return their questionnaire, 
which was extremely late and contained excessively detailed 
information. Primarily the PEC was interested in the
substantial cost overrun incurred on the IIRS building 
expansion programme. A similar in-depth inquiry had been 
undertaken on behalf of the Minister of State for Industry, 
Commerce and Tourism by officials from the Office of Public 
Works, the Departments of Finance and Industry and Commerce, 
who were assisted by an outside surveyor (42).
Numerous investigations w c » e. undertaken into the IIRS 
in the early eighties. In 1983, the National Board of 
Science and Technology issued their own report in which they 
recommended ' significant changes in IIRS structure and 
business practice. It was while the IIRS was in the process 
of implementing the NBST recommendations that the PEC 
commenced its own review. Having examined the general
thrust of the NBST report, the PEC concurred with its
findings. It added that the 'high cost, high specification
and the high allocation of space per person in the new IIRS 
headquarters building, now called Technology House, 
concerned the Committee', which essentially could not
understand why the IIRS felt it needed such an expansive 
building project in the first place (43).
The content of the IIRS report, like many other PEC reports, 
is highly technical and detailed and would probably hold
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greatest meaning for those concerned with cost accounting 
and financial control. In holding the' IIRS to account for 
its activities in the course of a fairly broad review, the 
PEC scrutinised an area of the public sector previously 
unexamined by members of the Oireachtas.
Additional Reports
As evidenced by the list of reports outlined in Appendix B 
the PEC tackled a great number of diverse and highly complex 
issues during its four years in existence. State 
expenditure was examined in a wide range of areas such as 
the fishing industry, the Shannon Free Airport Development 
Scheme, the Prize Bonds Scheme, the Industrial Development 
Authority and the Forestry and Wildlife Service. Intricacies 
of capital expenditure programmes, present, past and future 
were explored. Recommendations which were aimed towards 
rationalising and controlling such expenditure were 
outlined. These included forthcoming capital building 
projects like the new army headquarters and the Dublin
dental hospital. At all times the PEC objective was to
ensure that past mistakes would not be repeated and that 
taxpayers would get value for money. In only rare cases, 
e.g. tourism, was an increase in government expenditure
recommended (44).
Having recovered from a somewhat shaky beginning, the PEC 
undertook numerous carefully planned and co-ordinated 
reviews. Usually inquiries were undertaken as a result of
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written submissions which highlighted public service 
inefficiencies and pressed for a formal investigation. One 
such review, that on the Bovine T.B. Eradication Scheme, 
started in November 1985 against a backround of complaints 
and allegations. Many of those who had despatched written 
submissions to the PEC were later invited to give oral 
evidence. Organisations such as the Irish Farmers 
Association, Irish Veterinary Union, and the Association of 
Concerned Veterinary Practitioners participated in public 
hearings. However, due to the fact that the Department of 
Agriculture had simultaneously undertaken their own survey 
of the scheme, the PEC decided to delay their report until 
October 1986.
The PEC report on this matter was highly technical. 
Concentrating only on an evaluation of costs on the basis of 
evidence submitted, the PEC recommended a fresh start for 
the scheme, under new management, with a new authority and 
secure funding over a 4-5 year period. In particular the 
PEC criticised the high administrative costs which inhibit 
the scheme and urged a speeding up of the computerisation 
process. These recommendations were subsequently adopted as 
policy by the Fine Gael party and later by Fianna Fail, 
albeit in very modified form.
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Impact
Despite prolific and assiduous work, the PEC outlived the 
climate of goodwill from which it had developed. Gradually, 
the special privileges which marked this committee out from 
its contemporaries disappeared. By 1985, the guarantee of 
debating time in the Dail had become a source of great 
irritation for many outside the committee. From the outset, 
the clause in the PEC terms of reference providing that all 
reports be debated not later than the twelfth sitting day 
after publication, had never fully been observed. It 
progressed from debates being delayed one week to a month, 
until eventually no reports were ever debated in the Dail.
Seeking to debate their report on the Proposal to Introduce 
a Charge Card System for Civil Servants Travelling on 
Official Business, in November, 1985, the PEC encountered a 
resentful House. This was firstly because a debate on the 
report necessitated a late sitting, and secondly because 
members of the opposition sought to pursue what seemed to 
them to be more important issues. The leader of the 
opposition, Mr C.J. Haughey, commented irritably that 'the 
report on which the House is being asked to sit late tonight 
about credit cards for civil servants travelling is not 
exactly a major issue of policy requiring our time or the 
expenditure of this House sitting until a late hour ..'. He 
considered it to be unfair that 'the reports of some
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committees do not get in here at all and other committees 
seem to have a monopoly on our time'. He referred to this 
particular PEC report as one which he did 'not think is of 
any great moment' (45). Later, Bertie Ahern FF, who was 
then active on four committees, agreed with the party 
leader. He seemed resentful of having to discuss 'a silly 
old report, that means nothing, until midnight' (46).
The PEC did not dispute the fact that some of its reports 
would not merit a full debate in the Dail. Most probably 
the committee would have preferred a straightforward 
response to recommendations from the appropriate minister. 
However, since the membership were keen to protect what 
little access to the Dail already available to them, they 
hesitated to make an exception which might later be held 
against them. In general most reports do not require a full 
debate in the Dail. A formal government response, either 
written or in oral evidence to the committee would suffice. 
Currently, however, Oireachtas committees tend to take 
advantage of whatever channels are open to them until 
overall reforms are in place. In the case of the PEC, 
debating privileges were officially removed by motion of the 
Dail in December 1986.
The PEC, like the SSBC, was frequently informed that the 
subject of its scrutiny and deliberations was already under 
review and that Green Papers, White Papers and even actual 
Bills were in preparation. Generally this coincidence 
ensures that committee recommendations, when published, are
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either eclipsed by executive action or declared to be 
unoriginal. One such example is the 6th PEC report on the 
Department of the Public Service. During the Dail debate on 
this report, a White Paper, which included many of the PEC's 
recommendations, was said to be already in circulation at 
cabinet level. The PEC first commenced their review in late 
1983. They heard evidence from the Department of the Public 
Service between April and June 1984, and they published 
their report in May 1985. The White Paper, Serving the 
Country Better, was published by John Boland, then Minister 
for the Public Service, in September, 1985. Two months 
earlier, in July, the PEC report had gone through the House 
with emphasis on the expected White Paper which detracted to 
an extent from the substance of the committee's 
recommendations. It was stated in the course of the Dail 
debate that the minister was 'having the recommendations of 
the committee examined and evaluated in the context of the 
forthcoming White Paper on the Public Service which is now 
before the government' (47).
This example, of PEC recommendations and proposals said to 
be already under consideration at cabinet level, does not 
provide sufficient evidence to show that the committee had a 
direct impact on policy. Even in cases where the PEC issued 
proposals which later came into effect, there is no evidence 
to prove that the idea originated within the committee and 
that it had not been under consideration at executive level 
before the committee started their own review. Specifically, 
who conceived which ideas first is impossible to determine,
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but there are many examples similar to those discussed 
above which, while not sufficiently tracing a causal 
relationship between PEC activities and government policy, 
do at least suggest that the PEC was following a useful iine 
of inquiry a good deal of the time.
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The Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies
An examination of the Joint Committee on State Sponsored 
Bodies (SSBC), is crucial to any analysis of the Irish 
committee system for two reasons. Firstly, it came into 
existence long before the committee system in the Oireachtas 
was extended, and its style and practices impressed those who 
were later instrumental in extending the use of select 
committees. Secondly, unlike the Committee on Secondary 
Legislation of the EEC, which was prescribed by accession 
into the EEC in 1973, or the Public Accounts Committee, 
(PAC), which owed its existence to historical precedent more 
than anything else, the SSBC was established as a result of 
all-party lobby pressure which had sought accountability in 
the commercial state sector for over a decade.
In the years before the SSBC was founded, the need for 
greater accountability in the commercial state sector was 
widely acknowledged throughout the Oireachtas. Many TDs were 
alarmed at the disparity between official Government 
statements on the particular commercial state bodies and 
reports of mismanagement and unwise investments circulating 
in the media. Other than the ritual Estimates debate, no 
formal mechanisms existed by which TDs and Senators could 
monitor the operations of commercial state companies or 
assess their interaction with central government.
CHAPTER 3.
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Parliamentary questions relating to state-sponsored companies 
usually received bald replies or outright refusals to discuss 
matters affecting the public sector on the grounds that it 
would lead to accusations of government interference in the 
day-to-day running of state enterprises. Deprived of 
detailed and precise information, the average backbencher 
approached debates on commercial state companies or on 
industrial policy from a considerable disadvantage. Not 
surprisingly, many resented the fact that the media appeared 
to have better access to official information than they 
themselves had.
Public displeasure with commercial state bodies, partly 
caused by inefficiency and partly symptomatic of an ailing 
economy, featured regularly in the media and on the agenda 
for TDs conducting their constituency clinics. Inevitably 
that displeasure crept into political debate. A parliament, 
previously proud of its liberal reputation in state 
enterprise, sought increasingly to invoke stricter controls 
over decision-making in the commercial state sector. Such 
factors combined with an almost ritualistic witch-hunt by the 
media of Coras Iompair Eireann (CliOu. the Electricity Supply 
Board (ESB) and other prominent state agencies, provoked a 
strong parliamentary lobby in favour of appointing an 
all-party committee to inquire into state sponsored 
enterprises.
The effects of recession were felt by the commercial state 
companies as much as, if not more than by the private sector.
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Common descriptions of Irish state enterprise depicted a 
situation of chaos and general crisis. Agreement on the
causes of and possible solutions to this crisis has been 
precluded by the confused ideological assertions of the
political parties. A complex situation has been further
compounded by the lack of consensus within the parties
themselves. The case in favour of non partisan discussion 
and review, strengthened in the early 1970s, and the 
potential of the select committee as a forum for
investigative work was generally recognised. Eventually the 
government acceded to pressure from members in both Houses of 
the Oireachtas and a joint all-party committee, with 
extensive investigative powers, was established in May 1976. 
Initially the project began as an experiment with the primary 
objective of bringing parliament closer to the affairs of 
commercial state bodies without impairing their level of 
efficiency or enterprise. Over a decade later however, the 
SSBC represents an established and integral feature of Irish 
parliamentary life. This chapter looks at the operations of 
that committee during the period of the 24th Oireachtas.
Remit
Insofar as the SSBC is concerned with examining the 
operations of commercial enterprises in which the state is 
the sole or majority shareholder, its remit could be 
described as limited. The range and diversity of these 
companies however, and the nature of the economic and
political climate in which they operate, ensures that
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investigations have more far-reaching ramifications than 
their terms of reference imply. The extent to which 
commentary on policy issues relating to the commercial state 
sector is achieved however, has depended on how broadly the 
membership, particularly the chairman, have interpreted these 
terms of reference.
Appendix C lists the orders of reference agreed by both 
Houses when the SSBC was actually appointed in May 1978. 
Broadly they include the power to:
- - send for persons, papers and records
-- engage the services of experts, subject to the 
consent of the Minister for the Public Service
- - print and publish documents as it sees fit
-- present a report to both Houses of the Oireachtas 
for debate.
These terms of reference enshrine many limitations. Section 
2 prevents the SSBC from publishing confidential information 
when requested by the chairman of a state-sponsored body. 
When questioned in the Dail in 1983 about the purpose of this 
provision by Deputy Prionsias De Rossa, the then Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, John Bruton, declared it to be an 
essential safety mechanism designed to protect the 
commmercial operations of the state sector (1). Deputy de 
Rossa doubted the absolute necessity of such a provision and 
foresaw a situation in which it would be used by elements
88
within the executive to obstruct committee work. His 
predictions were not altogether unfounded.
The SSBC cannot appoint sub-committees, a factor which 
affects its work procedures more than anything else by 
limiting the number of investigations to one at a time and 
bringing a slower overall pace to proceedings. Work is 
conducted along the lines of a British royal commission 
inquiry, which, apart from being time-consuming also 
diminishes the SSBC's scope for asserting the day to day 
accountability of the agencies concerned. Twenty-six 
commercial state-sponsored bodies, also listed in Appendix C, 
are included in the schedule for investigation. Such a large 
number requires fast and streamlined investigative procedures 
which only a larger committee with powers to appoint 
sub-committees could achieve. Members are also unable to 
appoint substitutes to vote in their place. This provision 
serves to reinforce the power of the selection committees.
In 1983 and 1984, the SSBC conducted reviews of Ostlanna 
Iompair Eireann Teo., (OIE), and Irish Shipping Ltd., (ISL), 
both of which were experiencing severe financial 
difficulties. The government took emergency action on both 
companies before the SSBC had completed their review and thus 
pre-empted findings which would have been the main focus of 
the reports. The SSBC was thus forced to make vague, 
generalist recommendations relating to industrial policy and 
the relationship between state bodies and their sponsor 
government departments. Such commentary, although welcomed
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by the executive, was theoretically beyond the scope of their 
remit.
John Bruton, in his capacity as Leader of the House with 
responsibility for Dail reform, put forward a motion to amend 
the terms of reference in December 1985. It was agreed that 
in paragraph 1, all words after 'bodies' should be deleted 
and substituted with
to examine - -
A/ Reports and Accounts and overall operational results, and 
B/ the common issues relating to board responsibility and 
financing, together with the relationship with central 
government and the Houses of the Oireachtas of 
state-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial 
activities referred to in the schedule hereto and to report 
thereon to both Houses (2).
Whilst previously the SSBC examined each individual state 
body and reported with recommendations, the amendment 
empowered them to
examine ... issues common to a variety of, 
or more than one state body, relating to 
board responsibility, structure,
organisation, accountability, and financing, 
together with the relationship with central 
government and the Houses of the 
Oireachtas (3).
This amendment followed from a committment given in a 
coalition government White Paper on Industrial Policy
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published in April, 1984 (4). Among other subjects the White 
Paper addressed the overall financial position of state 
companies and identified weaknesses in their operations. As 
part of this general review 1 the Government decided that the 
SSBC's mandate should be extended to enable the membership to 
bring their experience to bear in a more constructive manner' 
(5). Extending the SSBC's remit in this way might at one 
stage have been interpreted as encouragement to address 
policy issues directly. Other reforms, however, such as 
liberalising the guidelines for civil servants giving 
evidence, or allowing the committee unrestricted access to 
corporate plans, which are a prerequisite if committees are 
to consider policy issues, have not been forthcoming.
Work Procedures
The SSBC usually meet in private on Tuesdays. Although they
are empowered to meet in public at their own discretion, such
hearings are the exception rather than the rule. SSBC work
procedures have evolved slowly over the course of the last
decade, with major changes being implemented recently. A 
characteristic feature of SSBC deliberations has been the 
almost exclusive concentration on one subject at a time. 
While many different issues comprise the agenda for each 
meeting, the main interest focusses on a single company 
rather than a broad number simultaneously.
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Efforts are made at the start of each year to devise the 
forthcoming agenda. Members are flexible in their approach 
and priorities tend to change from month to month. No 
straightforward criteria exist by which the subjects for 
investigation are selected. The immediate objective is to 
cover as many as possible of the twenty-six companies 
included in the remit. During the period under review, the 
committee set out to investigate three companies each year. 
It was found to be more expedient to focus on one large, one 
medium and one small company rather than three public sector 
'giants' like CIE, the ESB or Bord Telecom Eireann (BTE) in 
one year. Invariably members sought to focus on specific 
areas within the commercial public sector which interested 
them personally or professionally. Controversial companies 
frequently attract the attention of the committee, and 
fullscale investigations were often undertaken on the 
strength of media reports and critical submissions from the 
public. Topicality was but one of many criteria which 
influenced the choice of subject, however. When a company had 
last been examined by the committee, if at all, and the 
number of written submissions received relating to specific 
companies were recurring factors which affected the order of 
agenda for the coming year. Certain investigations logically 
follow on from one another. The review of the ESB, for 
example, may have been prompted by the submissions received 
during the hearings into Bord Gais Eireann (BGE), because of 
the commercial interdependence linking the two.
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Proposals for investigations are channelled through the 
chairman during preliminary meetings and a vote is taken to 
devise the agenda. Interview evidence suggests that the SSBC 
enjoys complete autonomy in planning its work, an essential 
characteristic for all select committees. Any interference 
at this stage would defeat the whole purpose of committee 
work, which is to make the commercial public sector and the 
central administration accountable for their actions. If the 
executive were instrumental in determining the agenda for the 
SSBC, impartiality would be entirely undermined.
Work procedures revolve around sending for 'persons, papers 
and records'. This power is subject to the consent of the 
Minister for the Public Service, (now Finance, 25th 
Oireachtas). Once the subject for inquiry has been decided, 
submissions are invited from interested parties through 
advertisements placed in the national newspapers. The 
company under review is requested to submit backdated annual 
accounts, market and planning information and in some cases 
relevant corporate plans. The sponsor government department 
is always asked to submit a memorandum by a specified date. 
When other organisations/individuals are likely to have views 
of interest to the SSBC, they too are invited to make 
submissions. Each member of the Dail and Seanad is notified 
of forthcoming inquiries by circular letter which invites 
comments or formal submissions. If the SSBC becomes aware of 
earlier consultancy reports in relation to the subject of its 
inquiry, copies are obtained on a confidential basis. All
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relevant statutes, parliamentary debates, publications of 
various official organisations, such as the Central
Statistics Office, the Central Bank, the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI), the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC), and reports from various newspapers and
periodicals are obtained.
The SSBC depends greatly on engaging the services of 
specialists from the private sector. Without such
assistance, the volumes of technical material which dominate 
commercial enterprise would prove too much for the generalist 
skills of Oireachtas members. With the consent of the 
Department of the Public Service, the committee employ a 
full-time economist to act as its permanent advisor. On
his/her recommendation, they commission additional 
consultancy services where necessary. SSBC research and 
advisory staff set out to evaluate all the aforementioned 
documentation from which briefing papers for committee 
members are prepared. These papers generally outline the key 
issues and propose a list of relevant questions which the 
membership might put to witnesses during the hearings. Armed 
with volumes of backround data, members confidently 
interrogate their witnesses during public hearings.
From time to time submissions are invited from companies with 
whom the subject is trading, with a view to ascertaining the 
degree of customer satisfaction with the service, e.g. Air 
Canada were invited to comment on Aer Rianta operations. 
Trade union deputations usually submit their views for
94
consideration. This was particularly so during the 24th Dail, 
due possibly to the chairman's professional interest in 
industrial relations. Most trade union representatives, with 
one notable exception, those from the ESB, were very keen to 
co-operate with committee inquiries and evidently valued the 
forum for discussion which the committee provided (6). Other 
witnesses proved less eager to co-operate. Officials from the 
Department of Energy and the Department of Communications 
refused to attend public or private SSBC meetings on the 
grounds that a line of inquiry was being followed which was 
policy related and therefore precluded civil service 
attendance, or alternatively because it was felt by those
expected to give evidence that they could contibute nothingi
of any more significance than what had already gone before
(7).
Faced with a refusal to give evidence, the SSBC, like other 
Oireachtas committees, is without power to subpoena. The 
most it can expect is intervention on its behalf from a 
minister who supports an inquiry and is prepared to overrule 
his civil servants. Apparently there has been only one 
occasion on which a minister did so, and that was during the 
Public Expenditure Committee inquiry into the Department of 
Health (8).
Satisfied that the full facts have been established by its 
inquiry, the SSBC deliberates over successive drafts of its 
report and prepares recommendations. In 1982 the Consultative 
Group of Chief Executives of State Organisations recommended
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that SSBC procedures be amended to allow the agencies under 
review to proof a draft report before publication so as to 
correct any possible errors of fact. The Group emphasised 
that such corrections would not .obviously affect the 
recommendations of the Joint Committee but would avoid 
possible difficulties arising when findings were made public 
(9). The SSBC decided that, while it welcomed the offer to 
check factual material intended for inclusion in reports, it 
could not agree to submit a draft report in its entirety to 
any body or organisation (10).
A completed report is laid before both Houses of the 
Oireactas, usually accompanied by an application to the Ceann 
Comhairle and the whips office for debating time. While SSBC 
reports have occasionally been debated in the Seanad they 
have rarely been directly debated in the Dail. Between 1978 
and 1983, for example, the committee completed eighteen 
reports, not one of which was debated in the Dail. The 
committee is free to publish any documents it sees fit. 
Usually these publications include minutes of evidence from 
public hearings and reports and occasionally the 
'proceedings' of every meeting (11). Such data account for 
attendance, duration of meeting, and also refer to the 
subjects discussed or voted on. But 'proceedings' are very 
unspecific and could contain greater detail which might offer 
a clearer picture of committee work. Minutes of Evidence are 
not always published, especially if the committee agrees that 
discretion is required. Those giving oral evidence during 
the enquiry into Udaras na Gaelteachta were guaranteed
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confidentiality and might not have participated without it. 
The hearings were held in camera.
Since its inception the SSBC has experienced four changes of
government, two of which were shortlived. While it is clear
that the continuity of investigations has been affected, the 
extent to which overall efficiency of operations has been 
impaired by interruptions is difficult to ascertain.
Membership
The SSBC has eleven members, four from the Seanad and seven 
from the Dail. During the 24th Oireachtas five members were 
drawn from Fianna Fail (FF), senators Eoin Ryan and Brian
Hillery and deputies Seamus Brennan, Albert Reynolds and 
Robert Molloy. The remaining six members were drawn from the 
coalition parties: four from Fine Gael (FG), senator Brian 
Fleming and deputies Michael Begley, Liam Cosgrave and Willie 
O'Brien, and two from Labour, senator Timmy Conway and deputy 
Frank Prendergast. By comparative standards the SSBC is a 
very small select committee, considering that membership is 
drawn from both Houses of the Oireachtas. Being small it
tends to generate much competition for places with the result 
that only larger parties are represented. Naturally this 
causes distress among the smaller parties, particularly the 
Workers Party (WP), whose special interest in the SSBC was 
accomodated by FF during the shortlived 23rd Oireachtas, but 
later ignored by the coalition administration. In the course
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of its work the SSBC often touches on sensitive ideological 
issues relating to state enterprise, a factor which may 
explain the reluctance of larger parties to accommodate the 
interests of a smaller left-wing party like the WP.
Of the eleven members initially appointed in 1983, less than 
half were backbenchers who had not held ministerial office. 
Several from FF had commercial business interests and 
management experience, and one, an academic, specialised in 
industrial relations. Several members had other select 
committee duties. Willie O'Brien FG, was a member on three 
other committees, Selection, Procedure and Privileges,^ Womens 
Rights^ and chairman of a fourth, the' Joint Committee on 
Marriage Breakdown. Seamus Brennan FF, was also a member of 
the Selection Committee and Albert Reynolds FF, and Michael 
Begley FG, were members of the Joint Committee on Building 
Land of which Robert Molloy, then FF, later PD, was 
chairperson. Frank Prendergast Lab, and Liam Cosgrave FG, 
were both members of the Joint Committee on Crime, 
Lawlessness and Vandalism.
Continuity and coherence in a committee's work is crucial—to 
its overall success and impact. If the key to continuity lies 
with the membership, then the SSBC was fortunate to retain 
the presence of very active participants. Eoin Ryan FF, ex 
chairman, had been with the SSBC since 1978, as had Willie 
O'Brien. Austin Deasy FG, had been a member since 1979 when 
he replaced Tom O'Donnell, MEP, FG, as had Brian Hillery FF, 
who replaced Des Hanafin FF. By the end of the 1982-87
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parliament there had been only one departure: Gene Fitzgerald 
FF, left and was replaced by Robert Molloy.
The composition of the SSBC, like all parliamentary 
committees, is determined by the party whips, who advise the 
Committee of Selection. Expertise is not the ultimate 
criterion in the selection of members. The most striking 
feature in the appointments to the SSBC over the years has 
been the absence of politicians of strong left-wing views. 
Even the Labour Party delegates have been drawn from the less 
radical wing of the party. One such delegate, Timmy Conway, 
has since left the Party to join the Progressive Democrats 
(PDs).
Frank Prendergast was elected chairman in June, 1983. His 
appointment had been previously agreed by the party leaders 
and the whips, as was Seamus Brennan's appointment as 
vice-chairman. They interchanged roles: Brennan acted as
chairman on the inquiry into ISL in 1984, the year in which 
Prendergast was Lord Mayor of Limerick. Whilst differences 
in method between deputy Prendergast and the previous SSBC 
chairman, senator Eoin Ryan, were imperceptible, they shared 
few similarities in style. They came from very different 
professional and political backrounds, Ryan having developed 
extensive business interests and Prendergast focussing 
primarily on industrial relations prior to and during his 
tenure in the Dail.
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Table 3 indicates membership performance on the SSBC during 
the 24th Oireachtas. Figures are drawn from a sample of 
fourteen public meetings from which minutes of evidence were 
published. Meetings took place in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986. 
Attendance from the Dail was slightly below the overall 
average for the committee whilst attendance from the Seanad 
was significantly above average. A list of members is 
included in Appendix C .
Table 3 .
SSBC Attendance and Participation
Meetings No.of
Attended Questions
Prendergast
1
12 |
1
217 |
Brennan 9 | 268 |«
Begley
I
7 |
1
93 |
Cosgrave 8 29
Molloy (1) 2 j 2
O'Brien 5 20 |
Reynolds 8 II 316
Conway
I
11 | 124
Fleming 12 210
Hillery 12 94
Ryan 10 | 
1
66 |
1
Total no. of meetings:
Total no. of questions: 1439
Average attendance: 7.6
Average no. of questions: 130
Average Dail attendance : 7.3
Average Seanad attendance: 11.25
(1) Molloy replaced Fitzgerald who attended 1 out of 4 
meetings. Molloy1s attendance is out of a possible total of 
10.
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Investigations and Reports
Between 1983 and 1987, the SSBC conducted comprehensive
reviews of and reports on the following eight state-sponsored 
bodies: Ostlanna Iompair Eireann, Teoranta (OIE), Irish
Shipping Limited (ISL), Bord Gais Eireann (BGE), Electricity 
Supply Board (ESB), Bord Telecom Eireann (BTE), Udaras Na 
Gaeltachta (UnG), and Irish Life Assurance Company(ILAG). The 
report on ILAC, which was not completed before the
dissolution of the 24th Dail was published by a newly 
.eistabhsiial SSBC in May, 1987. Sample reports on OIE and ISL 
have been selected for detailed evaluation, while examples 
from th£ remaining reports will be used where appropriate, to 
highlight interesting aspects of select committee work.
Ostlanna Iompair Eireann
The investigation into OIE, (a hotel group which was then a 
subsidiary of CIE), formally began in December 1983, when the 
OIE board submitted oral evidence in a public hearing. The 
content of this evidence revealed a complicated and very 
unstable financial situation which, apparently, few members 
of the committee, or the Oireachtas, initially suspected. It 
soon became evident to the SSBC that its investigation into 
OIE was long overdue.
OIE had been experiencing severe financial and planning 
problems since 1974. It was in response to these problems
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that the coalition government appointed Liam St John Devlin 
as chairman that year. Of those four consultants' reports 
commissioned since 1973, each recommended an immediate 
capital injection of one and a half, four, six and eight 
million pounds respectively, if OIE were ever to regain 
market viability (12). The decision to inject this capital 
was still not forthcoming when the SSBC began their inquiry 
in 1983. During the hearings, SSBC vice-chairman, Seamus 
Brennan, highlighted glaring inconsistencies between the 
company's legal status and its business practices. OIE, 
officially a limited liability company, traded illegally 
(i.e. it was insolvent and therefore in violation of the 
1963 Companies Act), for almost four years (13). Despite 
familiarity with OIE's financial predicament, successive
governments failed to adopt curative measures which would 
halt the financial losses and prevent further deterioration.
Successive Irish governments have, for a variety of reasons, 
considered it appropriate that OIE retain a substantial
investment in Northern Ireland. Government investment in 
Northern Ireland through OIE was intended to fortify
constitutional claims and support a tourism policy which 
included the whole island and not just the twenty-six 
counties. Such investment was also expected to represent a 
confident trading image with the North. No minister in the
southern government was prepared to this investment (via OIE) 
in Northern Ireland, for to do so would be to undermine 
confidence in the Northern Irish economy. Such policy
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considerations ensured that the financial disadvantages 
facing OIE in Belfast were ignored. It was their involvement 
with the Russell Court Hotel in Belfast which signalled the 
beginning of OIE's financial troubles. An expensive 
refurbishment plan for the hotel went disastrously over 
budget and schedule, and the building itself was the target 
of two bomb attacks. The overall tourism value of Northern 
Ireland has been vastly diminished by the political strife.
Aside from these complications, the SSBC inquiry into OIE 
uncovered significant irregularities in its business 
practices, financial structures and, especially, its 
relationship with central government. A sum of two million 
pounds in Value Added Tax (VAT), Pay Related Social Insurance 
(PRSI), and income tax already collected from clients and 
employees, had not been paid to the Revenue Commissioners by 
OIE. Such evidence startled the SSBC membership which 
appeared to have been entirely unaware of OIE's difficulties. 
When asked if he could justify practices which cause company 
employees to be uninsured for any period of time, Dr Devlin, 
chairman of CIE and OIE replied:
They cannot be justified and I would not
attempt to justify them. But if one does not 
have the cash what can one do? I would have 
much preferred if the Revenue Commissioners
had made a claim against us in the courts...
Perhaps we would have appeared to act more 
responsibly .. if we had just announced that 
we had to close down the hotels because we
could not pay our PAYE or PRSI. We kept
the government informed about the situation. 
In my view what happened was that some sort 
of deal was done with the Revenue
Commissioners not to press us. I would
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prefer to have been pressed because it would 
have enforced a decision in regard to the 
hotels and that is what we wanted (14).
Further evidence revealed details about the relationship 
between OIE and its sponsor minister and department which 
astounded many members of the committee, and of the 
Oireachtas. According to the board of OIE, they were 
prohibited, through the indecision of their sponsor 
department and ministers, from taking any actions which would 
improve their financial position.
Every time we went to the Department for a 
decision as to the financing of the 
Hotels ... we were met with procrastination 
(15).
The OIE board wanted, and actively sought, a decision either 
to close down all operations or to inject the essential 
capital to return the company to profitability. Such aspects 
of OIE affairs had never received consideration in the Dail 
and the majority of TDs appeared to be unfamiliar with its 
situation.
It was quite clear to the board in 1980, 
that we could not go on running an insolvent 
company unless we got some guarantee from the 
Department .... that the Government would 
take us out in the event of bankruptcy (16).
There were seven different Ministers for Transport in the 
decade in which OIE's financial situation started to slide, a 
factor which may explain the difficulty in continuity and 
decision making. In evidence to the committee, OIE placed the
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blame, in no uncertain terms, on their sponsor department and 
ministers. Another picture emerged from the written and oral 
submissions, particularly those received from civil service 
officials. Without informing the department or the minister, 
OIE had entered into several unwise investments, one of which 
was the decision to invest in Powerscourt Restaurant, Dublin, 
at a time when all other such exclusive restaurants were 
facing financial difficulties in a diminishing market. This 
single investment incurred losses in excess of £250,000 over 
a period of two years (17).
Evidence submitted to the SSBG pointed to a lack of 
structured communications between OIE and its sponsor 
department. When questioned as to when and from whom he had 
sought permission to sell the Russell Court, (two-thirds of 
OIE's financial burden), Devlin replied that he had spoken to 
the Secretary of the Department of Transport:
Senator Fleming: But you have nothing on
paper?
Devlin: No (18).
More than one policy decision relating to OIE appears to have 
been communicated verbally and without any written 
verification to the chairman of OIE. Manifold evidence of 
disorganisation and incoherence in the running of OIE shocked 
the SSBC membership. In particular, they deplored the fact 
that both sides were submitting contradictory evidence.
Albert Reynolds FF, who had dealings with OIE while Minister 
for Communications, was a member of the SSBC participating in
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the inquiry. His experience served to explain certain 
details which Dr Devlin had omitted. Reynolds was present 
for only one public hearing, however. Significantly, he was 
absent for the submissions from the board of 0IE, the trade 
unions and the Department of Labour. He attended the 
submission given by officials from the Department of 
Communications who had once worked for him. It is impossible 
to assess whether his presence influenced either the content 
or the course of the inquiry. During this hearing Reynolds 
spoke thirteen times, a figure which is significantly low 
when compared with his usual participation rate in other 
hearings (19).
Only a few days after the SSBC first heard evidence on the
subject of 0IE, the Minister for Communications, Jim
Mitchell, announced the transfer of 0IE ownership from CIE,
under the Department of Communications, to CERT, under the 
Department of Labour. In March, 1984, five months before the 
Committee had completed their report, the Minister for 
Labour, Ruari Quinn, announced the appointment of a new
board, which would continue to operate as a commercial 
enterprise within the state sector. CERT's relationship as 
shareholders with the new 0IE was, contrary to impressions 
received at parliamentary level, only to be conducted at arms 
length. As part of this initiative to revamp the 0IE 
operation, all debts, which approached fourteen million 
pounds, were settled by the exchequer.
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This government initiative pre-empted findings which the SSBC 
intended to publish in their report. Consequently the 
contents of the actual report read somewhat like a post 
mortem on the old OIE operation. Of the eleven 
recommendations laid out in this report, only three were 
specific to OIE and its operations. All others were 
'relevant to the commercial state-sponsored bodies sector as 
a whole' (20).
It appeared somewhat co-incidental that the government took 
the initiative on OIE after a delay of so many years and so 
soon after the SSBC launched its inquiry. If there is a 
correlation between the two events then the SSBC must be seen 
to have achieved significant impact on the affairs of its 
subject. Even without a connection between the two events, 
the SSBC inquiry undeniably brought detailed and factual 
information to the attention of parliament which might 
otherwise have remained undiscovered. There are two sides to 
every story, and if the SSBC investigation into OIE served 
any purpose, it was to ensure that both sides were told. This 
OIE example also highlights the importance which timing can 
have on the outcome of committee work. Of those inquiries 
conducted by the SSBC during the 24th Oireachtas, it would 
appear that many were long overdue. In the case of Ostlanna 
Iompair Eireann, one can only speculate as to the effects 
which an SSBC inquiry, conducted five years earlier, might 
have had on the company's commercial practices.
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OIE, sponsored by the Department of Labour and loosely 
related to CERT, is currently a jewel in the crown of the 
commercial state sector which certain political parties have 
marked out for privatisation. The minutes of evidence taken 
during the inquiry and the final SSBC report on OIE will be 
useful sources of reference for those who will make the final 
judgement as to whether or not it will remain within the 
commercial state sector.
Irish Shipping Limited
The second of the SSBC reports completed during the 24th 
Oireachtas was based on an investigation into Irish Shipping 
Ltd. (ISL), at a time when rumours of its imminent collapse 
abounded. As with the OIE investigation, timing was crucial. 
A report on ISL had already been compiled by the first Joint 
Committee in March 1981 which commended 'the Board, the 
management, staff, masters and crews of Irish Shipping for 
the highly efficient manner in which they discharged their 
responsibilities' (21). The second SSBC report on ISL 
published in April, 1985, was couched in vastly different 
language which was highly critical of the same board of 
directors so highly praised in 1981.
ISL's considerable financial difficulties stemmed from a 
series of chartering agreements arranged by junior management 
representatives in 1979, without consent from the board of 
directors or the sponsor Minister of Communications. The
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projections on which the chartering agreements were based 
were later adjudged by shipping experts to have been wildly 
optimistic when measured against the adverse conditions 
prevailing in the world shipping market. Commencing in 1982, 
ISL incurred unsustainable losses for the first time in 
fifteen years arousing widespread fears for the future of the 
company. On April 11, 1984, whilst presenting a rescue 
package for ISL to the Dail in the Irish Shipping Amendment 
Bill, 1984, the Minister for Communications, Jim Mitchell, 
described the situation as disastrous. The new bill extended 
ISL's loan guarantee to thirty-four million pounds in an 
effort to help them withstand the crisis and Mitchell 
reassured the House that ISL would return to profitability 
within a year. The SSBC inquiry was launched in May, 1984 
and the first public hearing took place amid considerable 
publicity on June 18th, 1984. In November of that year, the 
company went into liquidation.
Measuring the impact of SSBC work in relation to ISL as a 
simple matter of tracing similarities between the committee's 
recommendations and the course of action pursued by the 
government would be fruitless. Once again, as with the OIE 
investigation, the order of events pre-empted and eclipsed 
the SSBC inquiry. Each and every critical decision on ISL 
was taken exclusively by the cabinet without any consultation 
with parliament or the Joint Committee. The announcement in 
the Dail at 5 p.m. on November 14th, 1984, of the decision to 
appoint a liquidator to Irish Shipping, came as a complete 
surprise to everyone outside the cabinet. An emergency
109
debate lasting six hours ensued, revealing considerable 
tension and anger all round. Virtually every speaker
deplored the cabinet's behaviour towards parliament and
towards the committee. What most aggrieved members of the
committee, and indeed the Oireachtas in general, was the
haste and secrecy with which ISL was compelled to petition a 
liquidator. A y  acting thus the government completely 
ignored the SSBC, whose work had already been frustrated by a 
lack of co-operation from the board of ISL and its sponsor, 
the Department of Communications.
Speaking as acting chairman of the ISL investigation, Seamus 
Brennan accused the government of
downright discourtesy to the committee of 
which many of us are members .. This move 
calls into question the point having a 
committee system. We should scrap the 
committee system unless the Government are 
prepared to work with it. It will not work 
without Government support. If the 
Minister had given us .two more weeks to 
finish our inquiries K which would nave got 
us out of this difficulty and stopped us 
becoming the laughing stock of the 
financial community in every banking 
boardroom all over the world tonight (22).
A number of politicians spoke in defence of the SSBC, 
suggesting that a completed investigation might have offset 
the emergency itself. C.J.Haughey felt that:
the decision should be set aside until the 
Oireachtas Committee, established to 
investigate the affairs of state companies, 
and who are now investigating the affairs 
of ISL, have had an opportunity to conclude 
their deliberations and report to the 
House (23).
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Those who spoke to defend the SSBC were possibly motivated by 
a desire to delay the liquidation of ISL until the Dail was 
in full possession of the facts, rather than by a genuine 
concern to protect the integrity of the select committee. 
Also protesting about the behaviour of the cabinet towards 
the committee was Deputy Lyons FF, who, although never a 
member of the SSBC, was at the time acting-chairman of the 
PAC. He said:
In one fell swoop they have undermined the 
activities of all committees set up to deal 
with various matters (24).
In spite of the secrecy shrouding the ISL crisis, the SSBC 
managed to compile valuable backround information on the 
affairs and finances of the company before it went into 
liquidation. This information proved essential to those who 
participated in debate and to the general flow of information 
to the media. Possibly, such evidence served to explain and 
perhaps even validate the move to liquidate ISL, for a 
consensus soon emerged among the largest political parties in 
support of the decision. Within weeks it was broadly accepted 
by FF and FG that any rescue package designed to revive ISL 
would only be at an excessive and therefore unaffordable cost 
to the exchequer. The SSBC report also raised issues which 
related to the state sector as a whole. It recommended that a 
more structured relationship be developed between government 
departments and their commercial state-sponsored bodies, and 
it highlighted mechanisms which might be useful in achieving 
this.
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Inevitably, certain SSBG inquiries touched on areas which, 
strictly speaking, fall outside the scope of its remit. Often 
these issues are highly controversial or politically 
sensitive. While in such instances, the membership generally 
refrain from direct comment, the views expressed by witnesses 
are published in the minutes of evidence. During the ISL 
inquiry, certain witnesses criticised the practice of making 
political appointments to the boards of commercial state 
bodies. In their view, such practices resulted in a loose 
degree of control over management decisions, as evidenced in 
the ISL situation. They also suggested that certain 
political appointees were unsuitable or unqualified for the 
specific nature of the commercial enterprise. They stressed 
that greater attention should in future be paid to technical 
expertise when such appointments are being decided.
We often wonder when we look at these 
boards - particularly with shipping which is 
a highly technical and complicated 
business- how few actual professional 
seafarers are on these boards or are even 
associated with the decision making (25).
That the inquiry into ISL was difficult and frustrating comes 
across clearly from the tone of the hearings. While 
struggling to establish the exact financial and management 
details, and faced with an unco-operative and elusive board 
of directors and civil service officials, the SSBC membership 
could not avoid the occasional angry outburst. Identifying 
the negligent party appeared to be the most elusive and 
therefore frustrating factor. This inability to pinpoint or 
properly attribute blame for ISL misadventures reflects a
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common dilemma in public management which may never truely be 
resolved. In this instance, the denouement of ISL had more 
far-reaching ramifications than had been experienced 
previously in the commercial state sector. Apart from 
substantial losses to the exchequer, and the liquidation of a 
major state enterprise, several hundred employees lost their 
jobs without compensation and the nation's commercial 
reputation abroad suffered a considerable setback.
Hearings such as those held by the SSBC often revealed as 
much about politicians as they did about the subject of the 
investigation. At times it was clear that certain members 
misperceived the role and powers of civil servants. On one 
occasion Senator Brian Fleming asked an official why he had 
not recommended the dismissal of the ISL board to his 
minister, causing the official abruptly to question Fleming's 
understanding of a civil servant's function (26). Deputy 
Albert Reynolds, also present, agreed with the official, 
arguing that in his experience as Minister for Communications 
any such interference would have aroused immediate outcry 
from the Dail accusing him of hindering the independence of 
the commercial state agencies (27).
If the investigation into ISL served any purpose it was to 
demonstrate how, without proper control and supervision, a 
successful state enterprise could go disastrously wrong. Like 
the OIE inquiry, the ISL investigation raised important 
issues which affected the commercial state sector in general. 
It demonstrated the need to redefine the roles of those
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involved with state enterprise, in the various ministries and 
at senior public service level.
Impact
The SSBC does not receive and has not been known to request 
formal government replies to the recommendations contained in 
its reports. Identifying government reaction to, or opinion 
of, its work is therefore beset with difficulties, 
particularly when reports are not debated in the Oireachtas. 
Alternatively one might consider verbal statements, where 
they exist, made by government representatives on issues 
relating to SSBC recommendations. By such accounts, 
successive governments have been well pleased with the work 
of the SSBC since its inception in 1978. Announcing the 
amendment to its terms of reference in the Dail, John Bruton, 
the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, commented that 
in the course of its work, the SSBC had
accumulated, in the view of the government 
a number of useful ideas about the general 
management of the state bodies as a whole, 
as distinct from the particular 
recommendations they made about the 
individual bodies on which they produced 
special reports (28).
Reports debated in the Seanad are publicly welcomed by 
ministers selected to speak on the government's behalf. The 
SSBC has not yet received direct access to debating time in 
the Dail. Usually its work is indirectly acknowledged in 
debates which relate to subjects on which the SSBC have 
compiled reports. On a very general level, the SSBC has
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affected policy decisions relating to the commercial public 
sector, but while a direct causal relationship between 
recommendations and actual policy decisions is not easily 
identified, according to John Bruton at least, a certain 
consensus has been made possible by SSBC efforts, and the 
1984 White Paper on Industrial Policy reflected ideas 
expressed by the SSBC over a series of reports published 
between 1979 and 1982 (29) . Acknowledging the merits of SSBC 
work, the coalition government ordered that 'as part of the 
general review of State-Sponsored Bodies ... the [SSBC's] 
mandate should be extended to enable the committee to bring 
their experience to bear in a more constructive manner' (30).
With proper initiative and slight modification of work 
procedures, the SSBC could successfully induce the executive 
to reply to its recommendations and ensure that reports are 
not left to gather dust on shelves. In the past, the 
tendency has been to conclude an inquiry with a report 
without adopting a follow-up strategy. Were the SSBC 
systematically to request a reply from each relevant sponsor 
department, six months or so after issuing a report, such 
information could then be published in regular progress 
reports and possibly bring a greater degree of relevance to 
SSBC work. The experience of the PEC, which first adopted 
such a follow-up strategy, has shown that replies will come 
if the salient points of reference are continually emphasised 
when dealing with government departments.
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SSBC members might endeavour to capitalise on their findings 
more often than they have in the past. After the occasional 
angry outburst during controversial hearings came an 
objective rationalisation of priorities which ensured that 
tempers were well calmed by the time the committee was ready 
to compile its report. This emerged, as a result, a somewhat 
tamer and blander document than observers and witnesses might 
have expected. Such factors imply a degree of
self-censorship inherent in SSBC work. By adhering to such 
strictly phrased terms of reference, members displayed a 
reluctance to adopt a wider interpretation which touched on 
matters of economic and industrial structure and the policies 
which determine it. Instead, the overall financial 
responsibilities and activities of commercial state-sponsored 
bodies were assesssed in detail and sheltered from 
controversy wherever possible. This safe approach ensured 
that members evaded the tendency to pronounce at length on 
complex and usually contentious policy issues, thus avoiding 
the danger of exacerbating party differences and antagonising 
the executive. Safety and caution, while suitably 
propitious, may well have caused the SSBC to miss valuable 
opportunities to clarify state involvement in commercial 
enterprise once and for all. On the other hand, by prolonging 
this calm and safe approach to it5 work, the SSBC has, 
wisely, protected its own existence.
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Despite the occasional refusal to supply appropriate 
information or even to attend relevant hearings, the civil 
service was usually helpful in assisting with SSBC work. 
Differences and antagonisms tend to arise when the subject of 
the inquiry is politically sensitive or experiencing 
financial or similiar difficulties about which the executive 
wish to keep silent. Most committees, including the SSBC, 
probably recognise the importance of maintaining cordial and 
polite relations with all witnesses, for they cannot afford 
to make unnecessary enemies of those on whom they depend for 
information. The submission of oral evidence to groups of 
politicians, in front of a sizeable public audience, is a new 
and challenging experience for public officials most of whom 
are unfamiliar with such form of accountability. Many 
perform ably and without difficulty. Others react nervously, 
particularly if they are required to defend matters abhorrent 
to the commmittee members, who use an inappropriately 
accusing tone when posing questions.
Members must observe a degree of courtesy and self discipline 
when interviewing witnesses, especially civil servants. The 
long term effects of 'difficult' hearings may be 
counterproductive, insofar as prospective witnesses might 
become discouraged from co-operating with select committee 
investigations or current witnesses may refuse to return for 
a second hearing.
Impact on the Civil Service
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The SSBC has introduced new precedents in accountability into 
the affairs of the commercial public sector and its 
relationship with the Oireachtas. This appears to be 
welcomed rather than resented by those who manage and direct 
commercial state enterprises. Whilst appreciating and wishing 
to preserve the principle of independence, many value the 
opportunity to communicate directly with members of 
parliament. Likewise SSBC members value their new found
access to detailed and educational information which will 
probably serve them well in debate or perhaps even as future 
members of cabinet (31). Both the hearings and the reports 
provide other members of the Oireachtas and the media with 
factual and interesting details on the operations of the 
commercial state sector. The media in particular find a
remarkable source of news material which otherwise might
evade them. The use of such material probably disappoints 
the SSBC which expects press attention to focus more on the 
substance of actual work rather than quarrelsome aspects of 
its relationship with civil and public servants.
The work of the Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored 
Bodies has undoubtedly improved the flow and quality of 
information on the commercial state sector. It also proves 
to be a remarkably cost effective means of research into
stace-sponsored bodies and their relationship with central 
government. Certainly the collected reports of the SSBC will 
continue to act as a primary source of reference for those 
interested in the activities of the commercial state sector. 
In this respect the SSBC can act much like a semi-permanent
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commission on state enterprise and industrial policy. 
Inquiries conducted by an all-party select committee, while 
being easily as cost-effective as, if not more than, those 
carried out by private institutions or university bodies, 
produce information which might not be available at all if it 
were not for the capacity of parliament to unearth it. It is 
an added bonus that the range and quality of the information 
contained in the minutes of committee hearings is so useful, 
giving, as it does, an insight into the structure and 
organisation of the civil and public service. Even accounting 
for the limits on its capability to extract information, the 
SSBC still appears to have had a greater capacity than any 
outside body.
The merits of SSBC work lie in its ability to extract 
information from the executive and to inject independent 
analysis into the diffuse processes of government. Where 
there have been similarities between SSBC recommendations and 
government initiatives, the role of the committee in these 
changes was not that of one single authoritative body 
compelling the government to act, but in providing a major 
public forum in which all those interested in improving the 
quality of industrial policy-making or the activities of the 
commercial state sector could voice and discuss their ideas. 
SSBC inquiries throw the light of publicity on the executive, 
they help lift the veil from the hidden processes of public 
sector management, and perhaps they are beginning to reassure 
the civil and public service that there is less to fear from 
public exposure than they might think.
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The Other Oireachtas Committees
The PEC and the SSBC were but two of seventeen select 
committees at work during the 24th Oireachtas. Of that 
seventeen, four were fairly recent creations: the Joint
Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies (SSBC), the Joint 
Committee on Co-operation with Developing Countries (CDCC), 
the Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation of the EEC 
(2ndLC), and the Joint Committee on Building Land (BLC). 
Seven were entirely new: the Public Expenditure Committee
(PEC), the Joint Committee on Small Businesses (SBC), the 
Joint Committee on Womens Rights (WRC), the Joint Committee 
on Marriage Breakdown (MBC), the Dail Committee on Crime, 
Lawlessness and Vandalism (CLVC), the Joint Committee on the 
Irish Language (ILC), and the Joint Committee on Legislation 
(LC). The remaining six committees are persistent features of 
parliamentary life. They were the Dail and Seanad Procedure 
and Privileges and Selection Committees, the Joint Services 
Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. The differences 
between the old and the new select committees is marked.
Mostly the older models are semi-permanent or statutory,
being constituted by standing order at the beginning of every 
new administration to perform traditional procedural duties.
CHAPTER FOUR
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The Dail and Seanad Selection Committees appoint House 
members to serve on other standing or select committees. Both 
were kept unavoidably busy at the start of the 24th 
Oireachtas because of the increase in the number of 
committees at work. Crucially the pool of candidates from 
which to draw membership was too small and few volunteers 
were prepared to accept double or even treble assignments. 
But selection committees are by their very nature dominated 
by party whips who have almost exclusive control in 
delegating duties to their colleagues. Consequently, the 
logistical problem of selecting and delivering membership 
passed back to the whips office, leaving the actual committee 
to perform a purely formal function. Nevertheless, the 
selection process, especially where a retiring committee 
member is to be replaced, is cumbersome and slow, mostly 
because appointments must be channelled through each House. 
As a result, many select committees are obliged to convene 
without full membership.
The Joint Services Committee is the Oireachtas housekeeper. 
It administers catering, information and secretarial 
facilities. The Dail and Seanad Procedure and Privileges 
Committees monitor matters relating to procedure and consider 
amendments to standing orders. Inquiries relating to the 
status and privilege of House members have led to controversy 
in the past, particularly during the 1970 arms trial and the 
allegations of phone tapping within Oireachtas offices which 
were investigated in 1981. Since 1983, procedural matters 
relating to the committee experiment have tended to dominate
121
proceedings, and only the Seanad committee has published 
reports.
The Dail Committee on Public Accounts, (PAC), has examined 
and reported on the financial accounts of the Dail since 
1923. Difficulties have arisen in recent years because of 
diminishing research and staffing facilities in relation to 
an increasing workload. Members are currently reviewing the 
appropriation accounts years behind schedule. While the PAC 
worked on several reports during the 24th Oireachtas only one 
has been published over the last few years and that concerned 
the Interim and Final Reports for 1979. which was released in 
May 1987. Active PAC members have complained recently about 
the lack of proper staffing and research services to assist 
them in their work, as well as of inadequate publicity both 
inside and outside the Dail. Essentially these complaints 
are symptoms of a minor identity crisis which the PAC went 
through, mostly as a result of friendly rivalry and 
competition inspired by the new Dail Committee on Public 
Expenditure (PEC). Members of each committee have suggested 
that the other enjoys an unfair advantage, the PAC because it 
had full access to and co-operation from the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, and the PEC because of its facility for 
reviewing current expenditure (1).
Since the latter period of the 24th Oireachtas, the PAC 
appears to have taken on a new enthusiasm. It has begun 
meeting every Thursday and usually in public. As a result it 
attracts far more media attention than before, particularly
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under the supervision of its new, media-conscious chairman, 
Deputy Gay Mitchell FG. At present it is seeking widespread 
reforms which will enable it to 'look at the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of government projects instead 
of just applying the normal regularity and financial audit'
(2). In other words the PAC are seeking the power to assess 
how much is being wasted and not simply how much is being 
spent.
The Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the EEC 
(2ndLC), was provided for under the European Communities 
(Amendment) Act, 1973, to establish a semblance of 
parliamentary scrutiny over the treaties and legislation 
passed by the institutions of the EEC. Despite being 
prescribed by a supranational institution it has, by its very 
existence, helped create a climate conducive to Oireachtas 
reform. Through diligent work habits it has set new 
precedents in scrutiny, investigation and deliberation. In 
the past, the 2ndLC has provided an excellent tutorial for 
its members who were instrumental in the development of later 
committees. During the 24th Oireachtas it produced an 
unprecedented 36 reports.
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The Joint Committee on Building Land (BLC), was the second 
investigative select committee to be set up after the SSBC 
which was established in May, 1978, The BLC first appeared 
during the 21st Oireachtas for reasons which had little or 
nothing to do with Dail reform. Those responsible for 
initiating the BLC inquiry sought to examine and recommend 
legislation relating to the uses and pricing of building 
land. First set up in 1979, the BLC was reappointed in 
September, 1982, and again in March 1983. It presented a 
report to the Dail in June 1985.
The rapid growth in building land prices over the last 
decades is seen to have affected industrial and national 
development programmes adversely as well as having
detrimental spin-off effects on the economy. The BLC was 
appointed with all-party support to re-examine the issues
addressed by the inquiry set up under Justice Kenny in the 
early 1970s and to evaluate the recommendations for 
constitutional change set out therein. Unlike the Kenny 
inquiry, the BLC received a remit which permitted a wide 
ranging approach to all issues connected with supply and 
cost, and, apart from the consideration of constitutional 
aspects of reform, it was also empowered to address the cost 
and feasibility of such reforms. Initially however, the 
Committee was not intended under its terms of reference to 
employ specialist consultants, and the government were 
concerned to ensure that it would return opinions or 
recommendations which depended on political judgement rather
than technical and expert advice (3). The membership of 13
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TDs and 7 Senators envisaged a different role for themselves 
and preferred to invest time and energy producing detailed 
research which would form the basis of valid and easily 
implementable recommendations. The report, which was finally 
published in June 1985, almost two years later than intended, 
was the product of complex and thorough investigative work 
which went beyond the initial expectations of the House.
The BLC applied to the Dail to extend its reporting-back 
deadline on three separate occasions (4). This delay was 
caused by several factors. First, they had undertaken a far 
more extensive task than the government had forseen. 
Secondly, the BLC experienced a rapid and somewhat 
unfortunate turnover in membership between 1983 and 1985. 
Ruari Quinn, who had played a significant role in the setting 
up of the first BLC in 1981, was also a member of the third 
BLC while junior Minister at the Department of the 
Environment. On promotion to the Department of Labour, he 
was forced to relinquish his place on the committee and was 
replaced by Fergus O'Brien who also assumed his ministerial 
role. Quinn, an architect, was very keen to bring about 
reform in the building land situation and had already acted 
as BLC chairman under the shortlived Fianna Fail 
administration.
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Michael Keating, Ray MacSharry and Jim Fitzsimons also
resigned from the BLC, and were replaced by Michael Begley, 
(who had first resigned and then sought reappointment), Sean 
Calleary and Denis Foley respectively. Keating and MacSharry 
evidently felt the pressure of other parliamentary
committments, one as chairman of the PEC and the other as 
Fianna Fail shadow spokesman on Finance.
Table 4 below shows the attendance ratios and turnover of 
membership on the BLC between 1983 and 1985. Minutes of 
evidence were not published. Thus figures are based on the 
'proceedings' of BLC meetings which were published with the 
report. Since proceedings include every BLC meeting held 
during this period, they may be accepted as absolute evidence 
of attendance. No further evidence of membership performance 
is available since transcripts of meetings were not 
published. There were a total of 44 meetings in all and
average attendance was 52%. Appendix D includes a full list 
of BLC members.
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Table 4. Meetings
Attended
Percentage
Attendance
Begley (1)(2) 1 4(9),2(21) | 20 |
Calleary (3) 1 10(14) | 71 I
Coveney 1 31 | 70 |
Doyle 1 27 | 61 |
Fitzsimons (4) I 9(38) | 24 |
Foley (4). I 3(6) | 50 |
Keating (2) 1 K23) | 4 1McLoughlin (1) I 16(35) | 46 |
MacSharry (3) 1 13(29) | 45 |
Molloy 1 34 t 77 |
O ’Brien, (1) 1 23(35) | 66 |
Quinn (1) 1 5(8) | 63 |
Reynolds 1 8 | 18 |
Shatter 12 27 |
Skelly ! 20 | 45 |
Walsh 1 16 | 36 |
Wyse 1 38 |i i 86 |
Bulbulia 11 27 61 |
Cregan 1 11 1 25 |
Durcan 25 57 |
Fallon 34 77 |
Ferris 1 30 | 68 |
Fitzsimons 1 38 1 | 86 |
Ryan I 28 | 64 [
Total number of meetings 44 
Total number of hours 57 
Average duration in mins 77 
Average % attendance 52
(1) Begley and Quinn were discharged, and O'Brien and 
McLoughlin appointed in substitution for them. 1 February, 
1984. lo m / i  + * - » C  '‘-'«vimu niinbf r ft.
Ct\<M could Uavfi c\ hfri-v'c(eot.
(2) Keating was discharged and Begley was appointed in 
substitution for him. 5 July,1984.
(3) McSharry was discharged and Calleary was appointed in 
substitution for him. 14 December, 1984.
(4) Fitzsimons was discharged and Foley was appointed in 
substitution for him. 24 April, 1985.
(5) The figures in parantheses represent the total number of 
meetings held during the period of membership for those 
deputies who left or joined the committee after its initial 
establishment in the 24th Oireachtas.
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Apart from the BLC, six other select committees also 
undertook specialist investigations. They were the Joint 
Committee on Marriage Breakdown (MBC), the Joint Committee on 
Womens' Rights (WRC), the Joint Committee on Small Businesses 
(SBC), the Joint Committee on Co-operation with Developing 
Countries (CDCC), the Joint Committee on the Irish Language 
(ILC) and the Dail Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and 
Vandalism (CLVC). Each was forecast to exist for a short 
period or until such time as they completed their remit. 
Some, like the BLC, were given an official time limit which 
they failed to observe. Both the MBC and the BLC did report 
back to the Dail by the end of 1985, the former amid 
significant controversy. In the case of the other five, 
however, a continuous and indefinite approach characterised 
their work and they undertook several different inquiries.
The Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism Committee (CLVC) looked 
at issues varying from garda recruitment to the role of 
Customs and Excise officials in controlling the supply of 
illegal drugs. Having produced 15 reports it was adjudged by 
the incoming Fianna Fail administration to have sufficiently 
exhausted its remit. The Small Businesses Committee (SBC) 
produced 7 reports, each a wide ranging assessment of the 
commercial and legal factors influencing the development of 
small businesses in Ireland. While the incoming Fianna Fail 
government did not reconstitute the SBC, its greatest impact 
must be measured in terms of the 1987 legislation banning 
below cost selling and demands for 'hello money' by 
supermarket chains (5). In announcing the plans for the new
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legislation Albert Reynolds, Minister for Industry and 
Commerce made explicit reference to the SBC recommendations 
and congratulated the membership on their report (6).
The Joint Committee for Co-operation with Developing 
Countries (CDCC), was the third investigative committee to be 
established, after the SSBC and the BLC. However, having 
enjoyed a short life span in 1981, it was abolished by the 
Fianna Fail government in 1982 and later reappointed by the 
coalition administration in 1983. In addressing the subject 
of aid to developing countries, the CDCC touched on areas of 
foreign affairs, which in the normal course of parliamentary 
life receive little or no scrutiny. Indirectly the CDCC 
managed to project quite unlikely aspects of world affairs 
onto the political agenda, and it undoubtedly performed an 
educative function by informing parliament of the development 
crises facing the third world. It also drew Oireachtas 
attention to the problem of apartheid in South Africa. 
Still, the CDCC membership recognised their limitations and 
all research and inquiries were confined to selective issues 
of relevance to developing countries. According to Senator 
Brendan Ryan, Independent, their work could not 'address with 
any success or to any useful purpose, the global problem of 
underdevelopment in its entirety in a way which would not 
either produce a report which would probably be 2,000 pages 
long or else would be couched in such generalities as to be 
entirely useless' (7).
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Given the nature of its remit, the CDCC attracted a number of
politicians whose record in the Oireachtas suggests a
longstanding interest and commitment to issues which are not
the usual fodder for parliamentary representatives. Many
approached the CDCC because, like Senator Ryan, they felt an
'obligation and a role to play in heightening public
awareness on the issue of the level of development aid that
we are prepared to commit ourselves to. The Committee have a
great need to be heard on the issue and to be part of the
development education programme' (8). The setting for CDCC
work was unusual because it afforded a happy co-existence
with that small branch within the civil service assigned to
oversee Irish aid to developing countries. In addition the
Committee could rely on significant co-operation from those
Ministers of State with responsibility for Development
Co-operation, Jim O'Keefe and George Bermii^iam, who bothA
eagerly supported the work of the committee. The CDCC was 
not reconstituted by the Fianna Fail administration in the 
25th Oireachtas.
The Joint Committee on the Irish Language (ILC), on the other 
hand, was reinstated by the new Fianna Fail government. To 
date it has produced three brief reports, two concerning the 
extension of the use of the Irish language in the proceedings 
of the Houses of the Oireachtas and one accounting for its 
activities during 1985-86. The annual La na Gaelige held in 
the Oireachtas emerged as a result of an ILC initiative.
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The general approach adopted by the remaining committees, the 
J-oint Committee on Legislation (LC) , the Dail Committee on 
Public Expenditure (PEC) and the Womens Rights Committee 
(WRC), suggests that they foresaw an ongoing future for 
themselves. While the WRC has been reinstated during the 
25th Oireachtas to continue its inquiries into areas relating 
to the status and the role of the woman in Irish society, 
both the LC and the PEC died with the last Dail.
The LC received perhaps the most complex remit of all the new 
committees. While it was appointed primarily to examine 
proposals for legislation referred to it by members of the 
cabinet, it also undertook to formulate its own ideas 
relating to law reform. Despite the fact that it examined 
and discussed numerous important and contentious bills, only 
two or three required that oral evidence be heard. 
Consequently the LC missed out on the publicity which public 
hearings attract. Working largely outside the limelight it 
earned a misleading reputation for inactivity despite being 
kept very busy examining complex and time-consuming 
legislation such as the Intoxicating Liquor Laws, the 
Bankruptcy Bill, the Building Control Bill and the Motor 
Insurance Bill, as well as proposals relating to data 
protection and freedom of information. Although it published 
only three reports during the 24th Oireachtas, at least 
another three just missed publication when the Dail was 
dissolved (9)
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The PEC, as outlined in chapter two, assumed a leading role 
in Oireachtas affairs between 1983 and 1987. Its very 
prominence may have engendered opposition from an incoming 
cabinet who were keen to offset any possible challenges to 
their leadership. Determined to make an impact, the PEC set 
great store by thorough and systematic work methods which 
could not be undermined or frustrated by unco-operative 
government departments. Those senior civil servants who 
resented being quizzed by the PEC cannot have looked forward 
to its reinstatement, and they may well have advised against 
it.
Use of Resources
Fearful for the future of their respective committees and 
conscious of the experimental nature of the system, members 
tended to adopt a cautious approach to their work,
particularly when it came to spending money (10). In an 
effort to conserve expenditure on research and consultancy 
advice, the PEC, for example, invited a large number of 
specialists to serve on an advisory commission which would 
guarantee access to expert information and advice. Other 
committees developed similiar relationships with expert
advisors, albeit indirectly. Although investigative work 
benefited greatly from such assistance, the manner in which 
this was procured was not without dangers. As a small body,
representative of parliament, each select committee is
obliged to maintain complete and undisputed neutrality. If
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close links are established with private agencies, this can 
leave a committee susceptible to bias, or at the very least 
to the accusation of bias.
On the surface, funding presented few problems. Finance is 
channelled through the vote of the Houses of the Oireachtas 
and the European Parliament, and the appropriation increased 
steadily from 1979 when it first appeared under the heading 
Consultancy Services for the Joint Committee on Commercial 
State-Sponsored Bodies. I t  grew from a sum of
£30,000 in 1979, to £300,000 in 1986. In 1987 it was cut to 
£100,000, and in 1988 to £50,000 (11). However, the full 
budgetary allocation has never actually been spent. Although 
no detailed expenditure breakdown is available for each 
specific committee, other indicators such as foreign travel 
and the number of consultants employed generally betray the 
financial cost. In descending order of importance, the budget 
was expended by the Dail Committee on Public Expenditure 
(PEC), the Joint Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies (SSBC), 
the Joint Committee on Co-operation with Developing Countries 
(CDCC), the Dail Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and 
Vandalism (CLVC), the Joint Committee on Small Businesses 
(SBC), the Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown (MBC), the 
Joint Committee on Womens Rights (WRC), the Joint Committee 
on the Irish Language (ILC) and the Joint Committee on 
Legislation (LC). Delegates from the PEC travelled abroad on 
five separate occasions, and those from the CDCC and the CLVC 
went abroad twice. But whilst the CLVC delegates made a 
short visit to Scotland Yard in London, their counterparts on
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the CDCC conducted comprehensive tours of Central and 
Southern Africa. Consequently, the differences in
expenditure were great. In addition to the assistance each 
received from full-time advisors, the PEC and the SSBC both 
made elaborate use of expensive consultancy services.
The annual expenditure estimate, however, signifies little 
more than pocket money to be divided among the committees. 
The real costs of the new committee system appeared under a 
diverse group of expenditure categories, ranging from 
research and secretarial expenses, through accomodation and 
telecommunications, to editing and publishing. Many of these 
remained unspecified. Beyond these lie additional hidden 
costs such as those incurred by government departments who 
invest considerable labour in preparing evidence to deal with 
detailed interrogations by the committees. Undoubtedly the 
PEC and the SSBC were the most expensive in these terms, 
since both relied considerably on hearing evidence from 
departmental officials and public servants. The hours of 
preparation invested by officials called to give evidence is 
indeterminate, but it is high by all accounts. In describing 
his experience 'managing' the DHSS in Britain, Sir Patrick
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Nairne claimed that 'at least^quarter of my time in the DHSS 
had to be devoted to responding to formal references to the 
E. & A. Department of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
and to preparing to give oral evidence to the PAC' (12). One 
suspects that the situation in Ireland is not dissimilar.
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Also worth noting are the additional personal and political 
costs accruing to those active on the committees. Contrary to 
suggestion, their work earns little or no electoral premium, 
except where a chairperson can develop a media profile. Even 
this is not without danger considering the risks inherent in 
being associated with controversial investigations.
If the returns on the overall investment, financial or 
otherwise, were measured according to output, then each 
committee registered some value. In all, 93 reports were 
published, with the 2ndLC, which uniquely has its work 
assignments dictated by the pace of EEC legislation, 
producing a total of 36. Of the new committees, none worked 
more assiduously than the PEC which produced 26 reports. The 
Dail Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism produced 
15 reports while the SSBC and the Joint Committee on Small 
Businesses produced 7 each. The Joint Committee on 
Co-operation with Developing Countries published 5 reports 
while the Joint Committee on Womens Rights and the Seanad 
Committee on Procedure and Privileges both released 4 reports 
and the Joint Committees on the Irish Language and on 
Legislation released 3 each. The remaining committees on 
Marriage Breakdown, Building Land and Public Accounts each 
published a single report.
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Select Committees and the Media
The introduction in 1983 of so many new committees at once 
presented significant logistical problems for the media. 
Oireachtas reporting had by this stage evolved into a fairly 
rational and workable routine. The three national daily 
papers, the Cork Examiner and RTE, engaged three full time 
reporters each to cover Dail and Seanad debates in shifts. 
Previously, information was gathered and pooled collectively 
using reporters from every newsroom. The merits of this 
system guaranteed that each paper caught the news as it 
happened, but sub-editors had to work overtime trying to 
elicit a story from a mishmash of data and styles. 
Independent Newspapers were the first to pull out of this 
system and adopt their own full time coverage. The other 
papers followed soon afterwards.
The number and range of new committees set up at the start of 
the 24th Oireachtas increased demands made on reporters and 
physically drew journalists away from House debates. It fell 
to 'general' reporters to cover committee hearings, which
they did on an irregular basis depending upon the volume of 
news available on the day (13). The result of this 
unsystematic approach to committee reporting was
inconsistency. Since committee hearings were not once-off 
occurrences, they were conducted as part of ongoing
investigations and could not really be treated out of
context. Without a specialist brief, or an understanding of 
the backround and objectives of the actual investigation, the
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general reporter focussed on issues of immediate news value. 
Whilst so many committees were working at the same time, 
meetings tended to overlap and journalists were sometimes 
running from one to another to maximise their coverage (14). 
Committee hearings could last anything up to two hours, a 
factor which did not lend itself to catching news deadlines 
or the interest of certain reporters.
The image of select committee work portrayed in the media has 
a lot to do with this general reporting style. General 
reporters seek to report and create news, not to analyse and 
evaluate specialist investigations. Committee hearings which 
are technical and specialist should similiarly receive 
specialist media coverage. An agricultural correspondent, 
attending hearings which inquire into Department of 
Agriculture projects might focus better on the content of the 
evidence than on off-the-cuff remarks accusing civil servants 
of wasting taxpayer's money. It can only reflect badly on 
select committee inquiries if their purpose is seen to lie in 
civil servant bashing. All such sensationalist media 
coverage diminishes the confidence which the cabinet, the 
parliament and potential witnesses have in the competence and 
good intentions of a committee.
Those journalists who regularly attend committee hearings, 
are left with a good impression of the system (15) . Unlike 
the House debates, committees are not dominated by 
long-winded and rambling speeches and meetings can sometimes 
prove entertaining, if not stimulating. Apart from this,
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committees do provide journalists with good copy as well as 
in-depth, up to date information on specialist subjects.
From the outset it was clear that certain committees were 
courting media coverage in the hope that it would enhance the 
political status of the members and give a positive profile 
to their work. Inevitably some committees attracted more 
attention than others, due either to the nature of their work 
or to the deliberate efforts made by the membership, 
particularly the chairman. Initially certain misjudgements 
in dealing with the press led to unwanted publicity. On 
occasion, members who left meetings early carried committee 
literature with them. Chatting casually to journalists 
outside, they were often persuaded to part with documentation 
which was not intended for publication, or at least had not 
yet received collective committee approval for release (16). 
In effect this constituted very unintentional leaks to the 
press. Seeking to overcome such indiscretions in the future, 
some committees, in particular the Committee on Public 
Expenditure (PEC), decreed that all written material be left 
behind and that press releases be collectively agreed upon by 
the committee. In practice committee chairman brief the 
media before and/or after all meetings.
Few committees escape unwanted publicity, especially where 
dissent characterises controversial investigations.
'Dissenters' are not reluctant to release information 
strategically to the press if they believe it can benefit 
their side of the argument. The more controversial the
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subject the more media attention it attracts. In the past, 
high profile inquiries conducted by committees such as the 
SSBC, PEG and the MBC were beset with media controversy which 
fed off the contradictory opinions expressed by the committee 
membership. Experimental as they were, none of the new 
committees could afford adverse publicity. Many were 
struggling to keep their work non party-political. One such 
inquiry was that held by the SSBC into Udaras na Gaeltachta. 
This difficult and controversial review was embroiled in 
legal complications, which had to do with elusive witnesses 
and disappearing files. Journalists from RTE were fed 
confidential material at an inopportune time for the inquiry 
which the committee were struggling to hold together (17). 
The MBC also experienced similiar difficulties as did the 
PEC, when their sub-committee draft report on the Bovine TB 
eradication scheme was released to the press. Such publicity 
did nothing to engender confidence in committee work and it
C\
cfi/*particularly disappointed those who had submitted evidence t o
A
- (18).
A TD's perspective on his work varies greatly from that of a 
journalist. As Ted Nealon, TD and ex-journalist remarked in 
the Dail 'one's priorities change during the transition from 
one area to the other. I do not want a crisis every day now' 
(19). This implies that a journalist approaches a news story 
in search of crisis and conflict. A diligent and quietly 
effective committee is much less newsworthy than a 
quarellsome, biased and badly organised imitation. Media 
speculation, leaks and contradictory public statements
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inevitably impair the long-term impact of committee work 
because they inspire annoyance among those whom committees 
should make an effort to placate.
Prospects for the Future
The select committees set up for the first time during the 
24th Oireachtas worked against significant odds. What should 
have begun as a modest experiment using three or four well- 
organised select committees had soon blossomed into an 
uncoordinated mish-mash of ideas and investigations. Thus 
the potential effectiveness of the new committees was 
immediately undermined by their superabundance. Existing 
research, accomodation and staffing facilities within 
Leinster House were already strained and those responsible 
for servicing Oireachtas committees resented the increased 
workload. Staffing requirements were significant as each 
committee called for a minimum of one full-time clerk and 
secretary. Those with a particularly heavy workload, such as 
the PEC, required further research and secretarial 
assistance. These additional pressures did nothing to 
inspire affection for the committees among the Leinster House 
staff. Future experimentation with select committees should 
only be undertaken when the appropriate staffing, editorial, 
publishing and accomodation infrastructure is set in place.
Future committees should also receive greater acknowledgement 
from the House for their work. Such recognition, formal or 
otherwise, has been thin on the ground in the past. While
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the coalition government did set about preparing reforms in 
Oireachtas business procedures which would guarantee a Dail 
debate for select committee reports at least once a month, 
the Fianna Fail administration have shown no signs of taking 
up the initiative where their predecessors left off. 
Alternatively, future governments might care to guarantee the 
attendance of their ministers when requested at committee 
hearings. This would provide each select committee with 
answers when they needed them, it would give formal 
recognition to their work and it would offset the need to go 
to the House for a debate on every report.
Interview evidence suggests that many of those interested in 
up-dating committee work procedures would favour restricting 
their meetings to days when the House is not in session, in 
order to ensure that select committee work did not detract 
from the House and that continuity in hearings would not be 
interrupted for divisions at every bell (20). This proposal, 
while of some benefit in segregating committee and House 
duties, would greatly disadvantage rural deputies whose 
constituency duties require them to return home as often as 
possible. Having to attend committee meetings while the House 
is not in session would inconvenience them. Such 
difficulties could be overcome if travelling committees were 
introduced and 'the deliberations of a select committee of 
the House could be dealt with in say Galway, Cork, Limerick 
or Tipperary where there would be the possibility of the 
public seeing how it worked and bringing with it a 
decentralisation of all things in Dublin as at present' (21).
CONCLUSION
Methodological complications preclude any definitive 
assessment of the effect of select committee work on the 
Dail. Of those very few select committee reports which were 
formally debated in the Dail, each drew small audiences, 
which were invariably composed of the relevant committee's 
membership. But the size of an audience is less a measure of 
parliamentary interest in select committee work than it is an 
indicator of electoral pressures which cause TDs to spend 
most of their time outside the chamber tending constituency 
matters. Attending a debate on a committee's report may in 
the long term be of less value than simply reading and 
absorbing the findings which are set out in reports and 
minutes of evidence, and on the basis of the facts and 
recommendations contained therein, tabling Parliamentary 
Questions, motions, supporting relevant lobby groups or even 
submitting a Private Members' Bill. Such follow-up on select 
committee recommendations might effect far greater results 
than complimentary speeches made on the floor of the House.
Evidence suggests that parliament makes inadequate use of 
select committee findings. Certain members of the Dail 
appear to be unaware, possibly by choice, of the work 
conducted in select committee. Even while discussing the 
value of extending the system during the January, 1983 debate 
on Dail reform, a number of politicians were continually 
referring to the need for improving administrative
142
accountability to parliament, especially with regard to the 
commercial public sector. As they spoke, more reports from 
the Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies 
(SSBC) were going to print without the prospect of a debate 
on the floor of the House. Few speakers during that debate 
made reference to the work conducted by the SSBC over the 
previous five years. This suggests that the Dail does have a 
tendency to set up investigative select committees and 
standing committees reviewing legislation only to ignore 
them. During the 21st Dail, Michael Woods, the then Minister 
for Social Welfare, participated in the standing committee on 
the Social Welfare Consolidation Bill. He recalled later that 
1 there was not anyone really interested in the work of that 
committee. One discovers when one passes such a Bill into 
committee that there is not anybody interested' (1). Evidence 
suggests that this experience, which is fairly typical, is 
partly caused by the lack of publicity and electoral 
recognition arising from committee work.
The failure of select committee members to attend meetings or 
members of the Dail to attend debates on committee reports is 
one thing, but the failure to observe and support committee 
findings is quite another. While a number of TDs, drawn from 
across the political spectrum, support the idea of select 
committee work complementing that of the floor of the House, 
just as many are inclined to extend and withdraw support as 
it suits them. Such ambivalence is particularly 
characteristic of Fianna Fail deputies, specifically those on 
the frontbench who expressed scepticism about Dail reform,
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even during that pivotal debate in January, 1983. Michael 
Woods commented that
it seems a little ridiculous in the context of 
certain serious economic catastrophes throughout 
the country that we will spend a number of days 
debating Dail reform with a large number of 
government speakers contributing to keep the 
debate going (2).
While Fianna Fail speakers did support the motion, many of
its frontbench representatives spoke at length about topics
which they would have preferred to debate sooner than Dail
reform. This highlights an ambivalence which seems to
suggest that committees will be supported only for as long as
their findings respect party policy and nothing of greater
party-political potential is happening meanwhile.
Neglect and ambivalence aside, select committee 
recommendations are gradually having some impact on 
government policy. To suggest a direct causal relationship 
would be misleading, but certain factors are indisputable. 
Where policy has derived in some way from select committee 
recommendations, relevant government spokesmen have not 
hesitated to make a formal acknowledgement. The Department 
of Labour policy document, for instance, on the amalgamation 
of the unemployment and training agencies, formally 
acknowledged similiar proposals contained in the PEC reports
(3). Announcing the decision to give officials of Customs 
and Excise powers of arrest in matters relating to drug 
smuggling, the Department of Justice also paid tribute to the 
recommendations outlined by the Joint Committee on Crime, 
Lawlessness and Vandalism Committee (CLVC), in their report.
144
Michael Woods, who chaired the CLVC, had also acted as Fianna 
Fail shadow spokesman on Justice. Almost eighty per cent of 
the present Fianna Fail cabinet were actively involved with 
committees while in opposition. Even if ministerial 
responsibility has dampened some of the enthusiasm for reform 
which may have preoccupied them in committee, each has 
promised to bear in mind problems highlighted by reports with 
which they were involved. It may be that where policy does 
derive in any way from select committee work explicit credit 
will be given where due.
Those within the government and civil service who resisted 
reform at the outset did so until the last. Seen from a 
political perspective, those who obstruct or express 
sceptical attitudes towards select committees hold fast to 
their traditional respect for the cabinet's supremacy over 
parliament - a respect which the majority of those in power 
or likely to be in power strive to preserve. Speaking on the 
subject of Dail reform, Brian Lenihan said that
in our efforts we must not forget that at the 
end of the day the buck stops with the
Government  Governments are the people who
must make the decisions and consequently, 
that consideration is central to the whole 
issue. T Whatever we do here as
parliamentarians must be regarded essentially 
as a kind of subsidiary or advisory function 
in that regard. ... it is a fundamental 
principle that the ultimate decision must 
reside in the elected Government. If we begin 
departing from that we will be entering a 
shilly-shally situation in which there is not 
a decision-making process working to its 
fulfil.ment (4).
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Referring specifically to the idea of select 
committees, Deputy Lenihan went on to say that he
would
not agree with any committee system that would 
in any way intrude on- or obstruct the basic 
decision-making process of politicians elected 
to Government, regardless of which party or 
parties may form the Government (5).
Commenting further, albeit in a way which implied a 
misunderstanding of the role of the select committee which is 
an integral feature of the House and therefore not an
'outside body' he said,
I believe in the politician. I believe in his 
right to stand up in parliament and express 
his views. When we....pass our powers to any 
outside body, democracy will be in jeopardy 
and open to question. If we pass our powers 
to the civil service, the media or any other 
body, we will make ourselves redundant (6).
This apparent misconception may well have been a deliberate 
attempt to misrepresent the role of committees in an effort 
to confuse the proposals under debate to extend their use in 
the Oireachtas. Lenihan pointed out he was
speaking as a democrat and a politician.
I believe in the practice of politics We
can play our role properly £o l°ng as we do 
not give to any other body powers that should 
reside only with the duly elected
government Neither this, nor any other
committee should try to take the legislative 
powers of this House. We cannot have a 
committee making financial decisions while 
the Government are also making such decisions 
too. That could be very dangerous. I am in 
favour of setting up a committee who know 
their terms of reference but not a committee 
set up as an alternative Government (7).
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Put another way, select committees are acceptable as long as 
they know their place - an interpretation shared by a 
surprising number of those interviewed in the course of this 
research. Interestingly, one active member of a very 
prominent select committee, who at one stage threatened to 
resign from his committee if the coalition government did not 
take cognisance of its recommendations, expressed a similiar 
opinion when interviewed shortly after his appointment as 
Minister of State in the current Fianna Fail administration
(8). It would appear that those who do not have access or 
potential access to ministerial office are keener to carve 
out a stronger role for select committees than those with 
either ministerial experience or expectations of such.
Before 1983, successive governments ignored calls to extend 
the use of select committees possibly because they feared 
that their own creations might one day backfire. When the 
coalition government introduced a wide range of select 
committees during the 24th Oireachtas, they did so in a 
somewhat disorganised and haphazard fashion. They
nevertheless ensured, through carefully drafted terms of 
reference, that the experiment could not turn against them. 
The infrastructure which would guarantee effective results 
was not forthcoming, nor were the necessary levels of 
staffing, accomodation, editing and publishing resources. 
Absent too was the essential access to the parliamentary 
schedule to debate committee reports. The experiment 
therefore consisted of a proliferation of disparate entities
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which could not properly be dubbed a 'system' of select 
committees. Future experiments will require a well planned 
structure which can rely on a solid infrastructure to 
maximise its potential effectiveness.
Despite the less than adequate setting in which the select 
committees of the 24th Oireachtas were obliged to work, their 
sheer existence did represent a new departure in 
parliamentary affairs. Notwithstanding the difficulties 
conditioning their inquiries, members failed to capitalise 
effectively on their findings. This may have been affected by 
the general newness of and lack of experience with select 
committees. Underachievement with the committees resulted 
from the failure to adopt useful follow-up mechanisms which 
would have made recommendations most effective. Members 
simply did not strike while the iron was hot, whether by 
tabling parliamentary questions when media and political 
interest was high or by drafting recommendations into bills 
and thus providing a useful framework for public debate. 
Those in the coalition government who favoured divorce for 
example, should have drafted a formal bill based on MBC 
findings before announcing the forthcoming amendment. Only 
then could those who rallied to oppose or support the 
amendment have participated within a clear and 
straightforward framework for debate and thus avoided the 
confused and disoriented chaos which ensued. Numerous other 
examples exist where ideas for legislation prepared in 
committee were not carried through to private members' bills 
or even parliamentary questions so that they might come on
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the agenda for debate. The failure to follow-up committee 
work in this way was probably caused by a combination of 
backbench humility in the face of a dominant party leadership 
and sheer lack of time, experience and motivation.
It was never reasonable to expect the fledgling new
committees to enjoy powers of command over the executive or
to become alternative machines through which backbenchers
could draft and enact legislation. The function of the
experiment was not to set up alternative cabinets, but to
channel informed opinion and analysis into the parliamentary
chamber, to present a framework for debate which might then
produce consensus or majority support for legislation. In
this it was largely successful. At no other time have members
of the Oireachtas received such well researched ammunition
with which to pester the executive, or to form their own
opinion on complex issues. Through investigating and
interrogating, the new committees produced countless
opportunities for future legislative initiatives. That few of
these became Parliamentary Questions or Private Members'
Bills, or still less, elements of government policy is not
the fault of individual select committees, which are merely
'«s
deliberative and as investigative assemblies, rather itfthe 
responsibility of the Oireachtas as a collective body of 
political parties made up of individual TDs to lobby for a 
constructive legislative agenda.
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Measured against the more modest objectives it set out to 
attain therefore, the select committee experiment was useful. 
Each committee made some impact on the area of its 
investigations, if not directly then at least indirectly by 
highlighting issues of importance. While it is the case that 
at least five reports were ignored for every one which 
received direct government acknowledgement or even media 
attention, it is nevertheless certain that committees, merely 
by choosing to inquire into a subject, were exercising the 
elected representative's power of scrutiny in a manner 
previously unprecedented in Irish politics.
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APPENDIX A
Pail Committee on Public Expenditure 
Terms of Reference
(1) That a Select Committee (which shall be called the 
Committee on Public Expenditure) consisting of 17 members be 
appointed to review the justification for, and effectiveness 
of ongoing expenditure of Government Departments and Offices 
and of State-sponsored Bodies not included in the Schedule 
to the Order establishing the Joint Committee on Commercial 
State-sponsored Bodies in such areas as it may select, and 
to report thereon to the House, recommending cost effective 
alternatives and/or the elimination of wasteful or obsolete 
programmes, where desirable.
(2) That the Committee have power to appoint sub-committees 
and to refer to such sub-committees any matter comprehended 
by paragraph (1) of this order.
(3) That the Committee and any of its sub-committees shall, 
unless they decide otherwise, hold their meetings in public 
under the conditions specified in Standing Order No. 74.
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(4) That the Committee or any of its sub-committees have 
the power to send for persons, papers and records and, 
subject to the consent of the Minister for the Public 
Service, the Committee have the power to engage the services 
of persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist 
it or its sub - committees.
(5) That every report which the Committee proposes to make 
shall, on adoption by the Committee, be laid before the 
house forthwith whereupon the Committee shall be empowered 
to print and publish such report together with such related 
documentsas it thinks fit.
(6) That the Committee or its sub-committees, shall refrain 
from publishing confidential information regarding the 
activities and plans of a Government Department or Office, 
if so requested by a Member of the Government or by the 
State-sponsored Body concerned.
(7) That the Committee present to Dail Eireann an Annual 
Progress Report on its activities and plans.
(8) That Members of the Government and Ministers of State be 
notified of meetings and be allowed to attend and take part 
in proceedings without having a right to vote.
PEC: Terms of Reference continued:
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(9) That the quorum of the Commettee shall be 5 and the 
quorum of each sub-committee shall be 3.
PEC: Terms of Reference continued:
That, not withstanding anything in Standing Orders and 
unless the Dail shall otherwise order, if the Committee on 
Public Expenditure lays before the Dail a report, three 
hours shall be set aside for debate on a Motion, that Dail 
Eireann takes note of the report, to be taken on a day not 
later than the twelfth day on which the Dail shall sit after 
the day on which the report shall have been laid before the 
Dail and at such time as shall be announced on the Order of 
Buisiness for that day by the Taoiseach; provided that where 
a division has been demanded on the Motion or any amendment 
proposed thereto the Ceann Comhairle shall postpone the 
taking of the division until 8.30 p.m. on the next Wednesday 
on which the Dail shall sit until that hour.
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Pall Committee on Public Expenditure 1983-1987 
List of Members
chairperson Michael Keating
vice-chair Michael O'Kennedy
Bernard Allen 
Michael Bell 
Paudge Brennan 
Richard Bruton 
Hugh Byrne 
Hugh Coveney 
Joe Poyle 
John Farrelly 
Liam Fitzgerald 
Colm Hilliard 
Liam Hyland 
John Kelly 
Noel Treacy 
John Ryan 
John Wilson
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APPENDIX B
Reports of the Pail Committee on Public Expenditure
1983-1987
1. Recruitment by the Civil Service Commission and the 
Local Appointments Commission (February, 1984)
2. Proposal to Establish a Centralised State Agency for
Persons Registering for Employment or Training.
(May, 1984)
3. First Annual Progress Report. (October, 1984)
4. Office of Public Works (November, 1984)
5. Review of Leasing of Public Sector Accomodation,
(May, 1984)
6. Review of the Pepartment of the Public Service.
(May, 1985)
7. Service of the Public Pebt. (July, 1985)
8. Control of Capital Projects. (July, 1985)
9. Review of a proposal to Introduce a Charge Card System
for Civil Servants Travelling on Official
Business. (October, 1985)
10. Review of Exchequer Costs of Travel and Subsistence. 
(November, 1985)
11. Faults in Buildings Occupied by the Public Service. 
(September, 1985)
12. Annual Progress Report 1984/85 (April, 1986)
13. Shannon Free Airport Pevelopment Company Limited.
(April, 1986)
14. State Support and Services to the Fishing Industry.
(May, 1986)
15. Institute for Industrial Research and Standards.
(July, 1986)
16. Review of Procedures relating to Road Openings by 
Utilities. (July, 1986)
17. Proposed Publin Pental Hospital. (September, 1986)
18. Prize Bonds Scheme. (September, 1986)
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19. Implementable Public Sector Savings. (September, 1986)
20. Department of Defence/Army Headquarters.
(September, 1986)
21. Forest and Wildlife Service. (October, 1986)
22. Bovine T.B. Eradication Scheme. (October, 1986)
23. Review of Public Expenditure on Tourism.
(January, 1987)
24. The IDA: A View of Certain Aspects of its 
Public Expenditure. (January, 1987)
25. International Comparisons of Parlimentary 
Accountability. (January, 1987)
26. Annual Progress Report, 1986. (January, 1987)
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APPENDIX C
Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies 
Terms of Reference
(1) That a Select Committee consisting of 7 members of Dail 
Eireann, (none of whom shall be a member of the Government or 
a Minister of State) be appointed to be joined with a Select 
Committee to be appointed by Seanad Eireann to form a Joint 
Committee (which shall be called the Joint Committee on 
Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies) to examine the Reports and 
Accounts and overall operational results of State-Sponsored 
Bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities referred 
to in the schedule hereto and to report thereon to both 
Houses of the Oireachtas and to make recommendations where 
appropriate.
(2) That, after consultation with the Joint Committee the 
Minister for the Public Service with the agreement of the 
Minister for Finance may include from time to time the names 
of further State-Sponsored Bodies in the Schedule and with 
the consent of the Joint Committee and the Minister for 
Finance may delete from the Schedule the names of any bodies.
(3) That if so requested by a State-Sponsored Body, the Joint 
Committee shall refrain from publishing confidential 
information regarding the Body's activities and plans.
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(4) That the Joint Committee shall have power to send for 
persons, papers and records and subject to the consent of the 
Minister for the Public Service, to engage the services of 
persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist it 
for the purpose of particular enquiries.
(5) That the Joint Committee, previous to the commencement of 
business, shall elect one of its members to be chairman, who 
shall have only one vote.
(6) That all questions in the Joint Committee shall be 
determined by a majority of votes of the members present and 
voting, in the event of there being an equality, shall be 
decided in the negative.
(7) That the Joint Committee shall have power to print and 
publish from time to time minutes of evidence taken before it 
and any such related documents it thinks fit.
(8) That every report which the Joint Committee proposes to 
make, shall, on adoption by the Joint Committee, be laid 
before both Houses of the Oireachtas forthwith, whereupon the 
Joint Committee shall be empowered to print and publish such 
report together with such related documents as it thinks fit.
(9) That 4 members of the Joint Committee shall form a 
quorum, of whom at least 1 shall be a member of Dail Eireann 
and at least 1 shall be a member of Seanad Eireann.
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Joint Committee on 'Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies
Schedule
Aer Lingus Teo.
Aer Linte Eireann Teo.
Aer Riante Teo.
The Agricultural Credit Corporation Ltd.
Arramara Teo.
Bord na Mona.
British and Irish Steam Packet Co. Ltd.
Ceimici Teo.
Comhlucht Siucre Eireann Teo.
Coras Iompair Eireann Teo.
Electricity Supply Board 
Industrial Credit Co. Ltd.
The Irish Gas Board.
Irish Life Assurance Co. Ltd.
The Irish National Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
The Irish National Stud Co. Ltd.
Irish Shipping Ltd.
Irish Steel Holdings Ltd.
National Building Agency Ltd.
Nitrigin Eireann Ltd.
Radio Telifis Eireann.
LJdaras na Gaeltachta.
Voluntary Health Insurance Board.
Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies
List of Members
Chairperson 
vice-chair
1983-1987
Pail
Frank Prendergast 
Seamus Brennan
L.T. Cosgrave 
Robert Molloy 
Willie O'Brien 
Albert Reynolds 
Michael Begley
Seanad
Brian Fleming 
Brian Hillery 
Eoin Ryan 
Timmy Conway
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Appendix D
List of Members Joint Committee on Building Land 1983-85
Pail Seanad
chairperson
vice-chair
(1)
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
Robert Molloy
Michael Begley/ 
Frank McLoughlin 
Hugh Coveney 
Avril Doyle 
Jim Fitzsimons 
Michael Keating/ 
Michael Begley 
Ray MacSharry/ 
Sean Calleary 
Ruari Quinn/ 
Fergus O'Brien 
Albert Reynolds 
Alan Shatter 
Liam Skelly 
Sean Walsh 
Pearse Wyse
Michael Ferris
Katharine Bulbulia 
Penis Cregan 
Sean Fallon
Jack Fitzsimons 
Brendan Ryan
(1) Frank McLoughlin replaced Michael Begley on 1 February 
1984.
(2) Michael Begley replaced Michael Keating on 5 July 1984.
(3) Sean Calleary replaced Ray MacSharry on 14 Pecember 
1984.
(4) Fergus O'Brien replaced Ruari Quinn on 1 Febraury 1984.
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persons interviewed
numbers indicate those interviews which have been 
referred to throughout the dissertation.
Deputy Monica Barnes FG, member of the Joint Committee on 
Womens Rights (WRC), 24th Oireachtas and chairperson in 
the 25th.
(Advisor to) Minister of State at the Department of 
Industry and Commerce, Seamus Brennan, 25th Oireachtas.
Deputy John Bruton FG, ex Minister for Industry and 
Commerce/Finance, leader of the House with responsibility 
for Dail reform and member of the Procedure and 
Privileges Committee (PPC), 24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Richard Bruton FG, Minister of State (Energy), 
member of Public Expenditure Committee (PEC) and chairman 
of PEC sub-committee, 24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Mary Flaherty FG, ex Minister of State at the 
Department of the Taoiseach, member of Joint Committee on 
Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism (CLVC), 24th 
Oireachtas.
Deputy Mary Harney, PD, member CLVC and Marriage 
Breakdown Committee (MBC), 24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Michael D. Higgins Lab, member of Joint Committee 
on Co-operation with Developing Countries (CCDC) and WRC, 
24th Oireachtas, lobbbyist for a joint committee on 
foreign affairs.
Deputy Michael Keating PD, ex FG, chairman of the PEC and 
member of the Joint Committee on Building Land (BLC), 
24th Oireachtas.
Deputy John Kelly, FG, member of the PEC, 24th 
Oireachtas.
Deputy Maurice Manning FG member of the Joint Committee 
on Secondary Legislation, 24th Oireachtas.
Minister Albert Reynolds FF, member of the Joint 
Committee on State Sponsored (SSBC), 24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Prionsias de Rossa WP, member of the SSBC, 1982.
Senator Eoin Ryan, member and ex chairman of the SSBC, 
24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Alan Shatter, FG, member of the MBC and WRC, 24th 
and 25th Oireachtas.
Deputy Mervyn Taylor Lab, member of Selection Committee 
(SC), and chairman of the Joint Committee on Legislation 
(LC), 24th Oireachtas.
Mr. Paddy Judge, Clerk to the PEC.
Mr. Chris O'Brien, Clerk to the SSBC.
Mr. Seosamh O'Riain, Clerk to the Joint Committee on the 
Irish Language.
Mr. Seamus Phelan, Clerk to the Joint Committee on 
Marriage Breakdown and the Joint Committee on Secondary 
Legislation of the EEC.
Mr. Padraig Donlon, Clerk to the Dail Committee on Public 
Accounts.
Mr. Tom Dwan, Clerk to the Joint Committee on 
Legislation.
in conversation with
Joe Timbs, principal at the Department of Industry and 
Commerce.
Deputy Bobby Molloy, PD, chairman of the Joint Committee 
on Building Land and member of the SSBC, 24th Oireachtas.
Editorial Staff of the Houses of the Oireachtas.
Fergus O'Rahilly, economic correspondent, RTE.
Linda Sherlock, Dail Broadcasting Service, RTE.
Fine Gael/Fianna Fail/Workers Party/Labour advisorsory 
and press office staff.
in correspondence with:
Deputy Vincent Brady, Fianna Fail chief whip, 24th 
Oireachtas
Minister Michael O'Kennedy FF, vice-chairman of the PEC, 
24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Desmond O'Malley, PD, vice-chairman of the LC, 
24th Oireachtas.
Deputy Frank Prendergast, chairman of the SSBC, 24th 
Oireachtas.
